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Abstract 
This thesis examines the military-industrial complex and ecological change in the 
American West during and after the Cold War. By specifically examining one 
munitions factory—the Rocky Mountain Arsenal—this thesis demonstrates two things. 
First, it shows that the environmental consequences of warfare are not limited to combat 
areas.  Second, it contends that the military-industrial complex continued to dominate 
the land after the Cold War ended. These arguments work together to demonstrate that 
the military-industrial complex dominated the Front Range’s environs through its 
weapons, waste, and its unilateral control over remediation. In both polluting the land 
and cleaning it up, the military-industrial complex demonstrated the extent of its control 
over the environment.
1 
Introduction 
From 1942 through 1982, a factory ten miles northeast of Denver, Colorado, 
significantly altered the region’s environment. This facility, the Rocky Mountain 
Arsenal, was a physical manifestation of the military-industrial complex. There the U.S. 
Army manufactured a wide assortment of chemical weapons, while large private 
businesses, such as the Shell Oil Company, produced pesticides. This military-industrial 
complex dominated the land. Throughout the Cold War, the Arsenal’s wares and waste 
accumulated in the soil, traveled in the groundwater, poisoned wildlife, and even 
generated earthquakes. The Arsenal’s borders did not confine these environmental 
changes. Toxins flowed from the Arsenal into nearby neighborhoods and waterways, 
poisoned animals migrated throughout the region, and Arsenal-induced seismic activity 
rocked the greater Denver area.1 While the material transformations caused by warfare 
often invoke images of Sherman’s march through Georgia and the Carolinas, the 
trenches of Ypres, and the streets of Fallujah, the history of the Rocky Mountain 
Arsenal demonstrates that the environmental consequences of warfare are not limited to 
combat areas.  
To understand the Rocky Mountain Arsenal is to recognize it as an example of 
the military-industrial complex’s hold on the American West in the twentieth century. 
In simple terms, the military-industrial complex is a shorthand for the close relationship 
between the military and large private firms. President Dwight D. Eisenhower coined 
the term in his 1961 farewell address to describe the “conjunction of an immense 
military establishment and a large arms industry” whose “total influence—economic, 
                                                 
1 For another study of how the military-industrial complex contaminated local lands and harmed nearby 
animals see Leisl Carr Childers, The Size of the Risk: Histories of Multiple Use in the Great Basin 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2015). 
2 
political, even spiritual—is felt in every city, every State house, every office of the 
Federal government.” This definition came with a warning. Worried about its power, 
Eisenhower implored the American people to “never let the weight of this combination 
endanger our liberties or democratic processes.”2 Time magazine offered a more 
complete explanation of the concept in 1969: 
The complex is not a well-organized, centrally directed entity. It is a vast, 
amorphous conglomeration that goes far beyond the Pentagon and the large 
manufacturers of weapons. It includes legislators that benefit from job-
generating military activity in their constituencies, workers in defense plants, the 
unions to which they belong, university scientists and research organizations 
that receive Pentagon grants. It even extends to the stores where payrolls are 
spent, and the landlords, grocers and car salesmen who cater to customers from 
military bases.3 
 
The military-industrial complex was a machine as large as the nation. Tax dollars, 
subsidies, legislation, labor, natural resources, and warfare provided its energy. It 
manufactured weapons, chemicals, machinery, automobiles, airplanes, ships, and 
thousands of other products. More broadly, this machine created international power, 
national security, and economic prosperity which, in turn, allowed Americans to have 
larger families. Like other machines, the military-industrial complex also generated 
environmental change.  
By the time Eisenhower counseled the nation to keep this machine in check, it 
had already taken hold of the West’s economy and environs. The military-industrial 
complex did not form during Eisenhower’s presidency, or even during the Second 
World War. As the historian Kurt Hackemer notes, the military-industrial complex idea 
“has been around for quite some time, even before President Eisenhower popularized it 
                                                 
2 Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Military-Industrial Complex Speech, 1961,” in Edward K. Eckert, ed., In War 
and Peace: An American Military History Anthology (Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 1990), 339-342. 
3 “Nation: What is the Military-Industrial Complex?” Time, 11 April 1969. 
3 
in 1961.”4 In 1979, the historian Benjamin Cooling looked to the relationship between 
the United States Navy and Carnegie Steel in the 1880s as the origin of the military-
industrial complex.5 Later, in 2001, Hackemer argued that the antecedents of military-
industrial complex predated the Civil War, beginning with the Navy’s relationship with 
private steam-technology firms in the 1850s.6 Yet, the scale of the complex before the 
Civil War was small in comparison to the national machine that produced American 
prosperity and environmental change in the twentieth century.  
The key parts of the machine, the Army and large industries, have long histories 
in the American West. Countless books document the Army’s wars and massacres 
against Native Americans in the nineteenth-century West.7 However, the Army was not 
solely an agent of destruction. Military forts, outposts, and supply depots provided 
Euro-Americans and some Native Americans with access to income and goods.8 In 
regards to industry, William Robbins’s Colony and Empire synthesizes much of the 
historical scholarship on the how eastern firms dominated and transformed the 
American West in the nineteenth century. According to Robbins, capitalism plundered 
the West’s environs and made westerners economically dependent on the East.9 In his 
groundbreaking 1985 work, The American West Transformed, the historian Gerald Nash 
                                                 
4 Kurt Hackemer, The U.S. Navy and the Origins of the Military-Industrial Complex, 1847-1883 
(Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2001), 2. 
5 Benjamin Frank Cooling, Gray Steel and Blue Water Navy: The Formative Years of America’s Military-
Industrial Complex, 1881-1917 (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1979). 
6 Hackemer, U.S. Navy and the Origins. 
7 For a small sampling see Gary Clayton Anderson, Ethnic Cleansing and the Indian: The Crime That 
Should Haunt America (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2014); Richard White, “It’s Your 
Misfortune and None of My Own”: A New History of the American West (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1993); Patricia Nelson Limerick, The Legacy of Conquest: The Unbroken Past of the 
American West (W.W Norton and Company, 1987); Robert M. Utley, Frontier Regulars: The United 
States Army and the Indian, 1866-1891 (Bison Books, 1984). 
8 Gerald D. Nash, The Federal Landscape: An Economic History of the Twentieth-Century West (Tucson: 
University of Arizona Press, 1999), 50. 
9 William G. Robbins, Colony and Empire: The Capitalist Transformation of the American West 
(University Press of Kansas, 1994). 
4 
contends that World War II was a watershed moment in the history of the American 
West. For Nash, the war “matured” the West and allowed it to “shed its colonial status” 
by diversifying its economy and ethnic population. Yet, as Nash readily admits, his text 
was “suggestive rather than exhaustive.”10 He left for future historians the task of 
identifying just how the war transformed the lives of female westerners and the 
environment. In 1989, the historian Donald Worster echoed the need for historians to 
study the war’s effects on the environment. Additionally, Worster pointed out that Nash 
only documented the positive effects the war had on the region. For Worster, perhaps 
the most important legacies of World War II in the West is how it made the region 
economically dependent on the military-industrial complex and poisoned the land with 
military waste.11  
Nash’s later work, The Federal Landscape, is perhaps the best overview of the 
economic impact that the military-industrial complex had on the West in the twentieth 
century. By focusing on economics and regional development, Nash argues that the 
twentieth-century West was “the creature of the federal government.” It was the federal 
government, Nash says, “that determined the pattern of farms in the humid regions, 
built the major roads and highways, and fostered growth of the principal cities of the 
West.” Furthermore, the federal government built dams, diverted rivers, forced Native 
Americans onto reservations, controlled vast stretches of land, and, most pertinent to 
this thesis “determined the shape of the large military reservations and their environs.” 
According to Nash, the military-industrial complex was the West’s biggest business 
                                                 
10 Gerald D. Nash, The American West Transformed: The Impact of the Second World War, reprint 
(Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1990), vii, viii, ix. 
11 Donald Worster, Under Western Skies: Nature and History in the American West (Oxford University 
Press, 1992), 10-11. 
5 
during the Cold War. This combination of large subsidized firms and the Department of 
Defense constructed factories, military bases, shipyards, radar stations, and arsenals 
across the region. From a distance, Nash explains, the military-industrial complex 
seemed to be “a conspiracy foisted on an unwilling populace.” However, this was not 
the case. In reality, “it was a product of what westerners, and Americans, wanted.”12 
The machine brought economic prosperity to the region. 
Over the past thirty years or so, other historians have focused on specific 
manifestations of the military-industrial complex in the West, including Hanford, Los 
Alamos, and the region’s uranium mines.13 Richard White’s The Organic Machine 
offers an excellent analysis of how one manifestation of the military-industrial complex 
transformed the Columbia River. White examines the river as an organic machine, an 
energy system comprised of water, salmon, human labor, and the Grand Coulee Dam.14 
The military-industrial complex harnessed the energy of this machine to manufacture 
plutonium at the nearby Hanford Nuclear Complex. This thesis borrows and augments 
White’s machine concept. The Columbia River may have been a machine in itself but, 
like the Rocky Mountain Arsenal, it also was a significant cog in a much larger 
machine—the military-industrial complex.  
                                                 
12 Nash, The Federal Landscape, 161, x, 78, 99. 
13Most of the works on the military-industrial complex in the West focus on social, cultural, political, and 
technological transformations. Few focus on the environmental implications of the complex. Those that 
do investigate the complex examine its nuclear footprints, not its chemical ones. For a good sample of 
literature on the militarized West see Kate Brown, Plutopia: Nuclear Families, Atomic Cities, and the 
Great Soviet and American Plutonium Disasters (Oxford University Press, 2015); John Findlay and 
Bruce Hevly, Atomic Frontier Days: Hanford and the American West (University of Washington Press, 
2011); Michele Stenehjem Gerber, On the Home Front: The Cold War Legacy of the Hanford Nuclear 
Site (Bison Books, 2007); Gretchen Heefner, The Missile Next Door: The Minutemen in the American 
Heartland (Harvard University Press, 2012); Jon Hunner, Inventing Los Alamos: The Growth of an 
Atomic Community (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2004); Traci Brynne Voyles, Wastelanding: 
Legacies of Uranium Mining in Navajo Country (University of Minnesota Press, 2015); Sarah Alisabeth 
Fox, Downwind: A People’s History of the Nuclear West (Bison Books, 2014). 
14 Richard White, The Organic Machine: The Remaking of the Columbia River (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 1995), ix. 
6 
White suggests that the military-industrial complex did not “kill” or “rape” the 
Columbia River, it only altered it. Although dams significantly changed the river by 
controlling what happened to its energy and by decimating its salmon population, the 
river continued to exist. Control of natural resources is an important characteristic of the 
military-industrial complex in the West. Nature is often unpredictable, and even though 
humans cannot fully master it, the military-industrial complex did exercise a 
tremendous degree of control, or domination over nature in the American West. The 
dams on the Columbia River, the manufacturing of plutonium, and the splitting of the 
Atom emblemized the military-industrial complex’s degree of technological domination 
over nature. Land and facility-ownership also constituted domination. While the 
military-industrial complex did not own the Columbia River, it did control the dams and 
the nearby Hanford plutonium plant. By controlling these installations, the military-
industrial complex determined their environmental consequences. Local residents, such 
as the Yakima bands and Euro-American fishermen, did not have the power to direct 
these facilities or their environmental repercussions. Their pleas for the protection of 
salmon went largely unheard.15 In the case of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal, the 
military-industrial complex dominated the land through its wares and waste. Local 
residents did not have the power to direct how these facilities operated or interacted 
with nature. 
Few historians have investigated the military-industrial complex along the Front 
Range. The influence that the military had on Denver was not lost on Nash. Ever 
focused on population, economics, and development, Nash noted that “like the silver 
rushes of the 1870s, war mobilization provided extraordinary stimulus for Denver’s 
                                                 
15 White, The Organic Machine, 59, 91-97. 
7 
economy.” The construction of new military camps, factories, and other facilities 
brought 100,000 new people to the metropolis, and forced the city to expand 
horizontally. This expansion in population, infrastructure, and services, helped cement 
Denver as “the ‘capital’ of a region 1,500 miles wide and 1,700 miles tall—sometimes 
known as the Rocky Mountain Empire.”16 The Denver historians Stephen Leonard and 
Thomas Noel also examine the growth of the Braggart City during World War II in one 
chapter of their exhaustive tome, Denver. They too recorded that the war was a boon to 
the city, bringing it new military installations and servicemen with dollars to spend. 
They also recognize that the war brought new problems as well. More than 1,300 
servicemen from the Front Range died in combat. Shortages, price controls, and 
gasoline restrictions also hit the city during the war. Nash and Noel and Leonard 
provide excellent assessments of Denver’s economy, population, infrastructure, and 
influence during the Second World War. Yet, one of the most important legacies that 
the new military facilities left in the city was their toxic footprints. 
During the Cold War, the American West—the Front Range included—
continued on the path that it began during World War II. The military-industrial 
complex continued to supply jobs to westerners, especially Coloradans, western cities 
continued to expand, and western lands continued to transform under the burdens of 
military pollutants. One of the few scholarly historical studies of the military-industrial 
complex on the Front Range during the Cold War is Len Ackland’s monograph on 
Rocky Flats. This facility was located ten miles northwest of Denver, occupying 
roughly the same line of latitude as the Rocky Mountain Arsenal. At Rocky Flats, the 
Dow Chemical Company and the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, and later Rockwell 
                                                 
16 Nash, The American West Transformed, 82, 83, 56. 
8 
International and the Department of Energy, constructed the explosive plutonium cores 
for most of the United States’s 70,000 nuclear weapons from 1952 to 1992. The history 
of Rocky Flats, Ackland argues, is a story about the federal government and private 
firms making the most destructive weapons in history and, in turn, creating 
environmental and health risks.17 Like Ackland’s work, this thesis hopes to elucidate 
how in pursuit of profit and the means of destruction, the military-industrial complex at 
the Rocky Mountain Arsenal significantly harmed the Front Range’s environs. 
Other historians have briefly investigated the military-industrial complex in 
Colorado Springs, another city along the Front Range. Ann Markusen and her coauthors 
examined Colorado Springs in chapter eight of their volume, The Rise of the Gunbelt. 
Colorado Springs’s history is extraordinary. At the end of the 1930s, the resort town had 
fewer than 35,000 residents. By 1985, it was home to numerous computer companies 
and 306,000 people. This transformation, according to the authors, was a result of the 
military-industrial complex moving into the city. During World War, the military 
directly invested in the city by building the Army’s Fort Carson and Peterson Air Force 
Base there. During the Cold War, the military selected Colorado Springs to be home of 
the Air Force Academy, as well as the Air Defense Command (ADC). Later 
reorganized into the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), the 
ADC monitored American air defenses and oversaw air-based assaults in the event of 
nuclear war. Perhaps most fascinating, the ADC operated from within the heart of 
Cheyenne Mountain. The military excavated and built inside Cheyenne Mountain to 
                                                 
17 Len Ackland, Making a Real Killing: Rocky Flats and the Nuclear West (University of New Mexico 
Press, 2002), 3; For a memoir on one woman’s experience growing up near Rocky Flats see Kristen 
Iversen, Full Body Burden: Growing Up in the Nuclear Shadow of Rocky Flats (New York: Broadway 
Books, 2013). 
9 
provide the shelter the ADC needed to weather a nuclear blast. The Cold War also 
brought major technology companies to Colorado Springs, including Hewlett-Packard 
and Kaman Sciences. Markusen and her coauthors argue that even though these 
technology firms did not choose to come to Colorado Springs because of military 
contracts, they were nevertheless attracted to the city because of the economic and 
population boom that accompanied the military’s presence.18 This argument is 
important because it demonstrates that the military and large private corporations did 
not always coordinate or plan their symbiotic relationship. Rather, in the case of 
Colorado Springs, the U.S. military inadvertently pulled large technological firms in its 
direction. 
However, Gerald Nash reminds us that sometimes the military-industrial 
complex did, indeed, work in a centralized manner. The history of Colorado Springs in 
the 1980s is one example of this. Important to Ronald Reagan’s so-called “Star Wars” 
initiative, the federal government made Colorado Springs a center for space defense by 
awarding the Consolidated Space Operation Center, the U.S. Space Command, and the 
Strategic Defense Initiative National Test Bed Facility to the city. To construct these 
facilities, the federal government awarded contracts to “at least thirty” large 
technological firms, including IBM, Hughes Aircraft, Ford Aerospace, and Honeywell. 
These contracts totaled $186 million in 1986 alone, and created an additional 36,200 
nonmilitary jobs between 1980 and 1985.19 Undoubtingly the military-industrial 
complex economically benefitted Colorado Springs.  
                                                 
18 Ann Markusen, Peter Hall, Scott Campbell, and Sabina Deitrick, The Rise of the Gunbelt: The Military 
Remapping of Industrial America (Oxford University Press, 1991), 176, 179, 187. 
19 Nash, The Federal Landscape, 92. 
10 
The military-industrial complex was not just an agent of economic change, it 
was also a force of environmental change. While Nash focuses on the economic history 
of the military-industrial complex, this thesis examines the environmental history of the 
Rocky Mountain Arsenal. The history of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal is an enviro-
military history. Even though military historians have long considered environment in 
their analyses, they have done so from the perspective of logistics rather than ecological 
issues. On the other hand, the comparatively young field of environmental history only 
has turned to the intersection of war and the environment relatively recently. In 2001, 
the environmental historian Edmund Russell published War and Nature. Briefly using 
the history of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal to frame his work, Russel argues that the 
paths of chemical warfare and pest control intersected and coevolved repeatedly 
throughout the twentieth century. Essentially, his argument rests on the ideological, 
technological, and organizational intersections between the military and large 
industries. Russell prompts historians to “rethink the relationship between war, nature, 
and human history” by recognizing the two-way interactions between humanity’s 
control of nature and warfare.20  
Russell followed this line of thinking in his next work, Natural Enemy, Natural 
Ally, a volume he edited with the historian Richard Tucker. Each essay in their 
collection demonstrates that war is a force of environmental change, and that the 
environment is a force in shaping war.21 These essays, much like War and Nature, 
challenge historians to evaluate interactions between war and the environment. 
                                                 
20 Edmund Russell, War and Nature: Fighting Humans and Insects with Chemicals from World War I to 
Silent Spring, Studies in Environment and History (Cambridge University Press, 2001), 3, 2. Richard P. 
Tucker and Edmund Russell, eds., Natural Enemy, Natural Ally: Toward an Environmental History of 
Warfare, (Corvallis: Oregon State University Press, 2004). 
21 Tucker and Russell, eds., Natural Enemy, Natural Ally. 
11 
Following Russell’s lead, other environmental historians examine dual interactions 
between the environment and armed conflict. Their writings founded a new subfield 
known as enviro-military history. This thesis continues their tradition, but also fills a 
significant vacancy in the historiography. Almost all enviro-military histories to date 
examine two-way interactions between war and nature on battlefields, areas of resource 
extraction, and zones of nervous détente. Few of them examine sites of arms 
manufacture and storage.22 
The historian J.R. McNeill wrote a handful of chapters on the relationship 
between military-industrial complexes and the environment. These chapters are 
scattered throughout various edited volumes. Two of McNeill’s chapters have 
profoundly influenced this thesis. In his afterword to Nation-States and the Global 
Environment, McNeill explains why the modern international system is not currently 
able to effectively combat global environmental problems. According to McNeill, the 
lack of global solidarity and will to make shared sacrifices makes international 
environmental problems unwieldy. For example, the global community has yet to 
combat climate change in a unified, comprehensive manner. This is partially because of 
“an essentially anarchic international system composed of numerous states.” In short, 
the current global order of nation-states makes it different for humanity to tackle 
                                                 
22 For major works in the field of enviro-military history see Kathryn Shively Meier, Nature’s Civil War: 
Common Soldiers and the Environment in 1862 Virginia (The University of North Carolina Press, 2015); 
J. R. McNeill and Corinna R. Unger, eds., Environmental Histories of the Cold War (Cambridge 
University Press, 2013); Megan Kate Nelson, Ruin Nation: Destruction and the American Civil War 
(Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2012);  Lisa M. Brady, War upon the Land: Military Strategy and 
the Transformation of Southern Landscapes during the American Civil War (Athens: University of 
Georgia Press, 2012); David Zierler, The Invention of Ecocide: Agent Orange, Vietnam, and the Scientists 
Who Changed the Way We Think About the Environment (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2011); 
Charles Edwin Closmann, ed., War and the Environment: Military Destruction in the Modern Age 
(College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2009); Lisa M. Brady, “Life in the DMZ: Turning a 
Diplomatic Failure into an Environmental Success,” Diplomatic History 32, no. 4 (September 2008): 
585–611. 
12 
transnational environmental problems. More pertinent to this thesis, McNeill also 
explains that “states often create environmental problems by pursuing their routine 
priorities.” He writes that “for the past two centuries, the foremost goals of most states 
have been security and economic growth. So they have built military-industrial 
complexes and nuclear weapons, at the cost of untold pollution.” Thus, in pursuit of 
their individual goals, nation-states created military-industrial complexes which, in turn, 
“sometimes knowingly, often unwittingly” created environmental problems.23 The 
Rocky Mountain Arsenal is an example of this scenario.  
The chapter J.R. McNeill wrote with David Painter for the edited volume War 
and the Environment also provides a good foundation for this thesis. In that chapter, 
McNeill and Painter examine the global environmental footprint of the U.S. military 
from the birth of the American republic to early twentieth-first century. Before 1890, 
McNeill and Painter contend, the U.S. military brought “widespread ecological change” 
to North American through frontier expansion, infrastructure construction, and by 
stimulating metallurgical industries through purchasing weaponry. After the United 
States acquired an external empire in the 1890s, the U.S. military’s ecological footprint 
expanded overseas. Even though many enviro-military historians investigated areas of 
combat, McNeill and Painter argue that the U.S. military’s environmental footprint after 
1941 was mainly “associated with military bases at home and abroad, with their 
infrastructure, with their chemical and nuclear wastes, and with their disruptions caused 
                                                 
23 J.R. McNeill, “Afterword: International Systems and Their Discontents,” in Erika Marie Bsumek, 
David Kinkela, and Mark Atwood Lawrence, eds., Nation-States and the Global Environment (Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 276. 
13 
by training and maneuvers.”24 This thesis tests McNeill and Painter’s argument using 
the Rocky Mountain Arsenal.  
The Rocky Mountain Arsenal’s history is not solely a story of environmental 
declension. Recognizing the land’s toxicity, the federal government designated the 
Rocky Mountain Arsenal as a Superfund site in 1987. When remediation workers 
spotted bald eagles roosting at the Arsenal, some local environmentalists and politicians 
called for the land’s transformation into a national wildlife refuge. The Arsenal’s 
transition from Superfund site to refuge became law in 1992. United States Code 2705 
directed the remediation of the land to be a collaborative effort between community 
members and the federal government. However, the forces who implemented 
remediation, the U.S. Army, Shell Oil Company, and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service, ignored most of the concerns and recommendations that the locals offered. 
Instead of being a celebration of local-federal cooperation, the Rocky Mountain 
Arsenal’s transformation from Superfund site to Wildlife Refuge was another 
expression of the dominance of the military-industrial complex. The U.S. Army and 
Shell continued to rule the land.  
The historiography of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal is limited. Visitors to the 
Rocky Mountain Arsenal National Wildlife Refuge’s gift shop will find that John 
Hoffecker’s Twenty-Seven Square Miles is the only book about the Arsenal on the 
shelves. Hoffecker, an excellent archaeologist at the University of Colorado Boulder, 
composed and published that brief monograph with the help of the Remediation 
Venture Office—an organization comprised of representatives from the Army, Shell, 
                                                 
24 J.R. McNeill and David S. Painter, “The Global Environmental Footprint of the U.S. Military, 1789-
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(College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2009), 13, 15-20, 28. 
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and the Fish and Wildlife Service.25 As a publication approved by the military-industrial 
complex, Twenty-Seven Square Miles offers a good chronology of the Arsenal’s history 
but serves more as a booster piece than a work of scholarship. Indeed, Hoffecker either 
downplays or fails to mention the more controversial aspects of the Arsenal’s 
remediation. 
One historian who did write about the Rocky Mountain Arsenal was William 
Cronon. In his edited volume, Uncommon Ground, Cronon offers a brief commentary 
on the Arsenal during its early years of rehabilitation. Promotional material for the 
Arsenal and a few newspaper reports follow his remarks. The Rocky Mountain Arsenal 
appears in Uncommon Ground, however, in the volume’s introduction as well as in a 
brief album, or as an interlude, between essays. Cronon did not intend to offer a 
complete or historical analysis. Rather, he constructed his commentary and the album of 
facsimiles to encourage readers to consider nature and all its complexities differently. 
For him, “the ability to blur the boundaries between ‘natural’ and ‘unnatural’ is 
precisely what makes the Rocky Mountain Arsenal…so useful for encouraging us to 
question our assumptions about what nature means and how we should relate to it.”26 
Although thinking about how wildlife were attracted to a toxic landscape does lead us to 
question what constitutes nature, this thesis leaves that discussion in the capable hands 
of Cronon. Instead, this thesis focuses on the military-industrial complex’s domination 
of the land and how its wares and waste created biological and geological changes at the 
Rocky Mountain Arsenal. 
                                                 
25 John F. Hoffecker, Twenty-Seven Square Miles: Landscape and History at Rocky Mountain Arsenal 
National Wildlife Refuge (Walden, Colorado: Walden Press, 2014), 8-9. 
26 William Cronon, ed., Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature, (W. W. Norton and 
Company, 1996), 35-44, 28. 
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Despite limited coverage, especially compared to other topics in enviro-military 
history, the Rocky Mountain Arsenal does appear in a few legal and historical studies. 
Professor of Law Stephen Dycus touched on the remediation of the Rocky Mountain 
Arsenal in his 1996 work, National Defense and the Environment. In it, Dycus 
examines the intersection of national defense and the environment from a legal 
standpoint in order to “present a framework for determining when environmental 
sacrifices are necessary to protect us from sovereign aggression or terrorism.” To do 
this, Dycus presents twenty-seven case studies that highlight the defense industry’s 
environmental footprint. One of these case studies focuses on a Rocky Mountain 
Arsenal’s waste reservoir, Basin F, whose toxic contents killed migratory birds who 
landed there. Dycus uses the history of Basin F to examine if a state, in this case 
Colorado, can “carve out a significant role for itself” in the cleanup of federal sites. 
While the State of Colorado wanted to oversee remediation of the site under the 
Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA), the Army dominated the cleanup under 
the auspices of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (CERCLA), also known as the Superfund law. In short, the issue here was 
jurisdiction. Dycus recounts that the 10th Circuit Court resolved this issue when it ruled 
that the State of Colorado could “carry out its own independent RCRA closure plan 
concurrently with the Army’s ongoing CERCLA response.”27 Yet, because Dycus 
published his work in 1996, fourteen years before remediation concluded, he was 
unable to evaluate if the State of Colorado did indeed end up playing a role in the 
cleanup. This thesis demonstrates that although the State of Colorado was certainly 
                                                 
27 Stephen Dycus, National Defense and the Environment (Hanover and London: University Press of New 
England, 1996) xiv, 91, 92. 
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interested in remediation, ultimately the Army, Shell, and the Fish and Wildlife Service 
dominated the process.  
Historians also have used the Rocky Mountain Arsenal to investigate how the 
military’s relationship with the environment changed over time. In a 2011 article, the 
historian Peter Coates and others examine the tensions between militaries and 
environmentalists, as well as the rise of military environmentalism in the United States, 
Great Britain, and France. While using the Rocky Mountain Arsenal as one of their case 
studies, the authors also direct the reader to consider areas off the battlefield as 
militarized environments. Overall, the authors argue that militaries have become more 
aware of their environmental impacts over time. Some militaries, such as Great 
Britain’s, even worked with concerned citizens to lessen their ecological footprints at 
military-training sites.28 However, the authors do not examine the relationship between 
the U.S. Department of Defense and the Denver community. This work differs from my 
own in focus and categorization. These authors are concerned with how militaries 
changed their relationship with the environment over time; this thesis evaluates the 
material and biological consequences of creating and storing weapons of war. It also 
stresses that although the U.S. Army became more environmentally-aware over time, its 
firm hold on the western landscape did not loosen. 
Rachael Salcido, a scholar of environmental and natural resources law, also 
wrote about the Rocky Mountain Arsenal. Salcido published an article on the Arsenal in 
The John Marshall Law Review in 2014. In it, Salcido sees the restoration of the Rocky 
Mountain Refuge as a “work-in-progress” despite the fact that the Army, Shell, and the 
                                                 
28 Peter Coates et al., “Defending Nation, Defending Nature? Militarized Landscapes and Military 
Environmentalism in Britain, France, and the United States,” Environmental History 16, no. 3 (July 1, 
2011): 456–91, 476. 
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Fish and Wildlife Service declared remediation complete four years earlier. To Salcido, 
in order for remediation to be complete the Army, Shell, and the Fish and Wildlife 
Service must convince the community to accept the Refuge despite its history of 
toxicity and the shortcomings of remediation. To do this, Salcido suggests that the 
Army, Shell, and the Fish and Wildlife Service move away from “simply burying the 
past and marketing the fabulous new open space” and adopt a new, transparent 
approach that communicates both the successes “of the [Rocky Mountain Arsenal] 
Refuge restoration and the short-sighted mistakes and past failures to protect the 
environment.” Salcido’s article also examines what legally and ecologically constituted 
restoration of the Arsenal. She examines several federal laws, such as CERCLA and the 
Federal Facilities Agreement, as well as if remediation was committed to “historical 
[ecological] fidelity.” Salcido’s work differs from this thesis. Salcido scrutinizes the 
Army’s “emphasis on image control” and provides insight to the legal and ecological 
aspects of remediation.29 This thesis takes a broader approach. It emphasizes that the 
Arsenal’s remediation revealed that the military-industrial complex refused to cede 
control of this landscape after the Cold War.  
Although this study draws on newspapers, scientific journals, and government 
reports, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) proved the most essential resource. 
Even though this thesis incorporates many military archival materials gathered via 
(FOIA) requests, much of the Arsenal’s history remains shrouded in secrecy. For 
example, this study was unable to unearth the medical profiles of the men and women 
who worked at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal both during the Cold War and remediation. 
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Therefore, it is unable to fully assess how the chemicals and weapons manufactured at 
the Rocky Mountain Arsenal interacted with the biology and physiology of the laborers. 
A few sources do exist, however, that show that some workers were poisoned by sarin 
gas while on the job at the Arsenal.   
Chapter one, “The Arsenal and the Environment,” describes the global and local 
environmental consequences of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal. Specifically, it examines 
the history of the facility from its creation in World War II and its operations during the 
greater Cold War. It also investigates how the incendiary bombs manufactured at the 
Arsenal destroyed three major cities across the globe during the Second World War. 
Chapter two, “A Military-Industrial Cleanup,” challenges the idea that the remediation 
of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal was a collaborative effort between locals and the 
federal government. Instead, it shows that the Army, Shell, and the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service dominated the remediation of the land and ignored local concerns. 
Finally, the conclusion briefly examines worker health using the few documents 
available on the subject. In all, the history of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal demonstrates 
that the military-industrial complex dominated the Front Range’s environment through 
its weapons, waste, and its unilateral control over remediation. 
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Chapter 1: The Arsenal and the Environment 
 The military-industrial complex came to Denver, Colorado, and changed the 
land. International conflict spurred this transformation. In September 1939, Nazi 
Germany invaded Poland. Nine months later, the Germans took France and began 
plotting to invade the Soviet Union. U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt responded to 
this global crisis with a variety of tools. While the Cash and Carry and Lend-Lease 
programs bolstered the defenses of American allies, Roosevelt also understood the need 
to strengthen the security of the United States.30 In 1939, FDR called for the 
modernization of the nation’s military. “Without modern weapons and without adequate 
training,” Roosevelt explained, “[we] would be hopelessly handicapped if we were 
attacked.” Throughout 1939, 1940, and 1941 the president courted Congress to increase 
the National Defense Budget. Congress repeatedly obliged, providing the War 
Department with the fiscal means to modernize and develop new military installations 
around the country.31  With this massive program underway, the United States of 
America entered World War II in December 1941.  
 
                                                 
30 For more on Cash and Carry and Lend-Lease see Edward R. Stettinius Jr., Lend-Lease: Weapon for 
Victory (New York: The Macmillian Company, 1944); Warren F. Kimball, The Most Unsordid Act: 
Lend-Lease, 1939-1941 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1969). 
31 “Text of Defense Message Asking For 552 Million,” Chicago Daily Tribune, 13 January 1939; 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Message to Congress on Appropriations for National Defense,” 16 May 1940, 
The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15954; Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, “Message of President Roosevelt to the Congress,” 31 May 1940, U.S. Department of State, 
Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1943), 542-543.  
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Table 1: National Defense Spending, 1937-1947.32 
 
Fiscal 
Year 
Total government spending 
in billions $ 
National defense 
spending in 
billions $ 
Percentage of 
total budget 
allocated to 
defense in 
billions $ 
 
1937 7.6 1.0 13.1% 
1938 6.8 1.1 16.2% 
1939 9.1 1.0 11.0% 
1940 9.5 1.7 17.9% 
1941 13.7 6.4 46.7% 
1942 35.1 25.7 73.2% 
1943 78.6 66.7 84.9% 
1944 91.3 79.1 86.6% 
1945 92.7 83.0 89.5% 
1946 55.2 42.7 77.4% 
1947 34.5 12.8 37.1% 
 
In the 1940s, the War Department militarized the Colorado Front Range by 
constructing factories, camps, air bases, radar stations, and even a practice bombing 
range in the region. One of the new installations on the Front Range was the Rocky 
Mountain Arsenal. Located ten miles northeast of Denver, Colorado, the Rocky 
Mountain Arsenal produced a wide variety of weaponry for the U.S. Army during 
                                                 
32 U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Historical Tables: Fiscal Year 2012, Budget of the U.S. 
Government (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2010), 21, 47; J. David Singer, Melvin 
Small, and Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, National Material Capabilities 
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World War II and the subsequent Cold War. The history of the Rocky Mountain 
Arsenal is just one part of an incredibly large and complex story of how the U.S. 
military transformed environments around the globe in the twentieth century.33 Above 
all, it demonstrates that military’s environmental footprint was not limited to 
battlefields, areas of resource extraction, or soldiers’ bodies. Through the manufacturing 
of war materials and chemicals, the military-industrial complex degraded Denver’s 
environment. 
Although many people outside of the Denver metropolitan area have never 
heard of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal, its history is not solely a local story. During 
World War II, the Chemical Warfare Service (CWS), a specialized branch of the Army 
that oversaw all aspects of chemical warfare and defense, fashioned numerous chemical 
weapons at the Arsenal. Its production orders included the M-69 and M-74 incendiary 
bombs, or “firebombs.” From 1943 through 1945, the CWS assembled 48,000 M-69 
and 30,000 M-74 bombs per day just north of Denver.34 These munitions destroyed 
sixty-nine cities across the globe, including Hamburg and Dresden in Germany, and 
Tokyo, the capital of Japan.35  
During the Cold War, the Rocky Mountain Arsenal’s effect on Denver’s 
environs became well known. In the late 1940s, when demand for war materials was 
low, the CWS leased a portion of the Arsenal to chemical manufacturers. Housing both 
                                                 
33 For a brief overview of the U.S. military’s global environmental footprint see J.R. McNeill and David 
S. Painter, “The Global Environmental Footprint of the U.S. Military, 1789-2003,” in Charles E. 
Closmann, ed., War and the Environment: Military Destruction in the Modern Age (College Station: 
Texas A&M University Press, 2009). 
34Army Service Forces Chemical Warfare Service, History of Rocky Mountain Arsenal Volume 1, Part 1, 
1945, Manuscript, 16-17, Rocky Mountain Arsenal Joint Administrative Record and Document Facility 
Physical Archives (hereafter cited as JARDF Physical Archives). 
35 Stephen J. Leonard and Thomas J. Noel, Denver: Mining Camp to Metropolis (University Press of 
Colorado, 1990), 223-224.  
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the CWS and private industries, the Rocky Mountain Arsenal was a physical 
manifestation of the military-industrial complex. Among the chemicals manufactured at 
the Arsenal were the pesticides dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT), aldrin, dieldrin, 
and endrin. These dangerous compounds found their way into the bodies of birds and 
small mammals that lived on and near the Arsenal grounds, accumulating in their livers 
and brains, reducing the quality of their lives, and sometimes ending them altogether. 
Wildlife mortality was not the Arsenal’s only environment consequence. In the 1960s, 
the facility suffered from an abundance of waste and an absence of long-term waste 
management solutions. To solve these problems, the Army began pressure-injecting its 
liquid refuse deep into the Earth. Earthquakes, previous rarities in the Denver region, 
became frequent nuisances six weeks after the military began this practice. Scientists 
quickly investigated the possible connection between the injection well and the new 
seismic activity. The majority of them concluded that the injection well induced the 
earthquakes. Thus, the military-industrial complex not only left an environmental 
footprint on the Earth’s surface, but on its innards as well.  
Before the War Department constructed the Rocky Mountain Arsenal, it first 
had to select a desirable location to house the facility. The task of selecting the site fell 
to the Missouri River Division of the United States Army Corps of Engineers (MRD).36 
Interested in the Denver region, the MRD examined the land ten miles northeast of the 
city. There it found small homesteaders who grew corn and alfalfa.37 Unfortunately for 
these farmers, when the MRD examined the land that comprised their homestead and 
other nearby farms, it found the model environment to house a modern munitions plant.  
                                                 
36Army Service Forces Chemical Warfare Service, History of Rocky Mountain Arsenal Volume 1, Part 1, 
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The first and most important factor that the MRD investigated was the area’s 
geography, specifically the proposed site’s distance from international borders. In order 
for the arsenal to be safe from external attack and enemy reconnaissance, it needed to be 
located deep in the interior of the United States. The MRD concluded that Denver was 
“nearly one hundred per cent safe” because of its distance from international 
boundaries. The fact that the Colorado metropolis also hugged the Rocky Mountains 
perhaps gave it a fortress-like quality in the minds of military engineers. Geography 
provided the security the site required.38  
Just as Denver’s physical distance from international borders was a boon to city 
in the minds of military planners, the city’s connections to the rest of the country via 
railways made it strategically and logistically ideal. Denver was the “isothermal axis,” 
or the location where the Atlantic World met the Pacific.39 First settled by Euro-
Americans in 1858 as a mining camp, by the end of the century Denver was the 
“capital” of the so-called “Rocky Mountain Empire.”40 Denver’s ascension was 
complex, and largely due to the innovation, business acumen, and community ethos 
held by its local entrepreneurs. Businessmen such as Jerome Chaffee, David Moffat, 
and John Evans reached for and created hinterlands for the city in order to expand their 
own personal wealth and benefit their community. In doing so, they led the charge to 
remove the Southern Cheyenne and Arapaho Indians from the region, created booster 
programs to attract farmers, invested in the local mines, enforced laws when they were 
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advantageous to their community, and established banks and railroads. Their efforts 
transformed Denver into a hub of market activity that directed “people, resources, 
information, and capital into and out of the region.”41 The city physically occupied a 
small portion of the Front Range, but its economic, political, cultural, and social reach 
was pervasive.42 Although the financial health of the city ebbed and flowed with the 
mining industry, its connections to the rest of the nation via railways stood firm. This 
system, a “spiderweb of steel,” both transformed the mining camp into a regional 
metropolis in the nineteenth century and attracted military development in the 
twentieth.43 
Accompanying these attractive features was the city’s willingness to provide the 
military with the water it needed. Manufacturing chemical weapons, especially nerve 
gasses, required millions of gallons of water each day. In 1942, the City of Denver, 
wanting to attract military investment, agreed to provide the CWS with twenty million 
gallons of potable water per day.44 In a region known for aridity, this was no small 
request. The history of water allocation in Colorado is a controversial one. Because the 
South Platte River did not contain enough water to support the metropolis, the Denver 
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Water Department began redirecting water from the Western Slope to the Front Range 
in the 1930s.45 Boosted by Public Works Administration money, in 1936, the Denver 
Water Department successfully completed its first trans-mountain diversion, channeling 
water from the Fraser River to a tunnel that bisected the mountains. Three years later, it 
completed its second trans-mountain diversion when it redirected the Williams Fork 
River via another tunnel towards the Front Range.46 Although the Denver Water 
Department did not plan these engineering feats with the War Department in mind, its 
accomplishments later made it possible for the military to consider the Front Range as a 
site for the mass production of chemical weapons. 
Along with a sufficient water supply, the arsenal needed sinks that could 
accommodate 16,500,000 gallons of sewage per day.47 One of the leading historians of 
urban sanitation systems, Joel Tarr, explains the concept in The Search for the Ultimate 
Sink. Tarr writes that “the creation of wastes from any process, be it a natural, 
consumer, or production process, requires location of a place of deposit, or a ‘sink.’ 
Much of the history of industrial waste disposal . . . involves the search for a sink in 
which wastes could be disposed of in the cheapest and most convenient manner 
possible.”48 Just as Tarr observed, the MRD looked for cost-effective and opportune 
sinks in the Denver region. They found the natural reservoirs near the farmland 
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northeast of Denver “adequate [for] waste disposal.”49 These reservoirs consisted of 
half-a-dozen depressions in the land about a hundred acres in size. Scientists later in the 
twentieth century surmised that bison carved these basins centuries ago by rolling in the 
dirt.50 Aside from the excavation of a few dikes and the construction of treatment 
facilities, these natural sinks required little military investment. The CWS simply had to 
direct its refuse to these basins and presumably allow it to evaporate over time. The 
MRD concluded that these basins did not “constitute a safety hazard to the streams and 
potable water supply in the vicinity.”51  
The MRD also examined, and was pleased with, the geology of the Front Range. 
The surface strata, consisting of wind-blown sands, clays, and humus top soil, were 
ideal for both water removal and construction. The “sandy nature” of the surface 
stratum and the rolling-prairie topography quickly drained water into nearby creeks and, 
ultimately, the South Platte River. The region’s surface strata also made extraction and 
earth-moving operations comparatively easy year-round.52 Below the surface strata was 
the Laramie Formation, which consisted of fossilized sandbanks and silt that geologists, 
today, categorize as sandstone, clay, and coal. This geologic structure, resting 
approximately thirty-five feet below the surface, resulted from the recession of the 
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Western Interior Seaway during the Late Cretaceous period.53 The Laramie Formation 
provided a solid foundation on which the military could build large warehouses and 
industrial machinery.  
Finally, the MRD assessed Denver’s climate. It found that Denver was overall 
“one of the best health areas in the country.” The area’s “pleasant weather conditions,” 
the engineers reported, would “contribute to better morale and higher operating 
efficiency among the personnel.” Planners defined “pleasant weather conditions” by the 
absence of meteorological hazards such as hurricanes, high winds, and abundant 
snowfall. The Front Range’s low humidity, according to the MRD, also made the area 
“especially suited to the manufacture of Chemical Warfare gases as well as smokes, 
incendiaries, and other material” whose handling and loading usually required extensive 
air conditioning to keep them dry.54  
Based on the MRD’s positive report, on May 12, 1942, the Under-Secretary of 
War Robert P. Patterson authorized the construction of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal on 
the 19,883 acres of farmland northeast of Denver. Before the CWS could break ground, 
however, it needed to force farmers off the land to make room for its facilities.55 In the 
summer of 1942, two hundred families received eviction notices and vacated their small 
homesteads in what the Denver Post called a “mass exodus.” Almost a dozen families 
left their homes before the required deadline of August 2, 1942. Others slowly packed 
their belongings as the clock ran out on them.56  
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In 1993, Ray Telfer remembered when the military dispossessed his family from 
their farm in the 1942. The Telfer family homesteaded their land beginning in 1912. 
They grew corn and wheat. A child at the time, Telfer remembered that his family’s 
eviction emotionally and economically devastated his parents. “Visualize this:” Telfer 
explained, “you don’t have a penny in your pocket, you’re deep in debt, and you’re told 
you’ve got 60 days to get out of your house and find a place to live. You have farm 
machinery. What are you going to do with it? You don’t have any place to put your 
animals, so you sell ‘em at whatever price you can get.” Although the government 
provided compensation for the loss of their crops, Telfer related that the money simply 
was not enough to cover the costs of relocation. Resigned to their fate, Telfer 
remembered that his family “tearfully accepted what was offered.” The process was 
especially painful for his parents. “Those of us who were young, our sight were set 
beyond the arsenal. But for our parents, who knew nothing else but dirt farming, it was 
a trauma. They had developed the farms as their place until death.” Yet, despite the 
trauma of land dispossession, Telfer looked back on the situation without bitterness. 
“As hard as it was to leave, it was the patriotic thing to do. Nowadays you hear this 
expression: ‘grief therapy.’ In our day, that concept was unknown even to Freud. The 
expression we heard was ‘T.S.’ Tough Shit.”57 
Unable to stop their eviction, many families quietly relocated to southeastern 
Colorado and the Western Slope.58 After the homesteaders vacated the land, the CWS 
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immediately began construction. By 1943, the Rocky Mountain Arsenal was fully 
functional, assembling 48,000 M-69 and 30,000 M-74 incendiary bombs per day.59  
 
Figure 1: Aerial photograph of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal South Plants in 1945. 
Behind the Arsenal, to the southwest, are downtown Denver and the Rocky 
Mountains. Photograph by the U.S. Army. Courtesy of the Library of Congress. 
 
The Rocky Mountain Arsenal was not the only military installation near the 
Queen City of the Plains. Although many Denverites were vocal isolationists in the late 
1930s, the city welcomed the jobs and dollars the defense industries brought. In certain 
cases, Denver’s leaders actively worked to attract the military. For example, in 1938, 
the city floated $750,000 in bonds to purchase 880 acres of property. After adding 
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another 960 acres to this plot, the city donated the land to the Army, along with 100 
square miles southeast of the city. There, the military constructed Lowry Air Base, a 
station comprised of more than 600 buildings and a practice bombing range. Other 
military installations quickly followed, including Buckley Field, Fort Logan, the Denver 
Ordnance Plant, Fitzsimons Army Hospital, Camp George West, and Camp Carson.60  
Richard White’s “It’s Your Misfortune and None of My Own” helps explain 
why the military-industrial complex invested and built in the West. According to White, 
defense contractors feared labor unions because of their ability to strike and cripple 
production. Thus, defense contractors “preferred the West and South, with their 
antiunion, right-to-work laws, over the East." Despite the growth of the military-
industrial complex in the West during World War II, White points out that the region 
still depended on its old extractive economy. “In the late 1940s,” White writes, “lumber, 
food processing, paper, transportation, and primary metals accounted for 80 percent of 
the region’s industrial output.” The oil booms in Texas and Oklahoma also kept those 
western states entrenched in resource extraction. Adding a global component, White 
recognizes that both extractive companies and defense contractors based in the 
American West expanded their reach outside of the United States. Western oil 
companies set up refineries in places like Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, and across the 
Persian Gulf. Meanwhile, western defense contractor constructed military bases across 
the Pacific.61  
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Figure 2: The Denver Metropolitan Area, circa 2007. This map identifies the 
major military installations near the city, including the Rocky Mountain Arsenal 
(RMA), Rocky Flats, and Lowry Bombing Range. The locations of these facilities 
remained static throughout the Cold War. Map by and courtesy of the Colorado 
Department of Public Health and Environment.62 
 
Even though much of the West continued to rely on extractive industries during 
World War II, Denver embraced the military-industrial complex. The military-industrial 
complex brought to the Braggart City thousands of federal dollars and servicemen 
looking to spend. During the war, Denver’s population increased by approximately 
twenty percent or 100,000 people, not including the workforce who lived on military 
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bases outside of the city.63 This influx of military personnel, the historian Lyle Dorsett 
notes, was comparable to the flood of miners who descended on the city during the gold 
rush days.64 As the Denver historians Stephen Leonard and Thomas Noel so aptly put, 
“War was hell on the fighting front, but on the home front it brought prosperity.”65 
 
Figure 3: Total Income in the State of Colorado in Millions of Dollars from 1935 to 
1945. While income between 1935 and 1940 increased by $170 million, during the 
Second World War income rose by $700 million in just five years. This was largely 
due to the growth of the military-industrial complex in the region.66 
 
 Incendiaries, not nerve gasses, were the chemical weapons of choice during 
World War II. The use of nerve gasses during the First World War prompted the League 
of Nations to create a protocol in 1925 prohibiting the use of chemical and biological 
weapons in combat. The treaty held up during the Second World War. The United 
States never joined the League and did not ratify the protocol. Nonetheless, Roosevelt 
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abided by its principles and refused to use nerve gasses “unless they are first used by 
our enemies.”67 FDR’s refusal to initiate the use of nerve gasses during World War II is 
just one example of how the president attempted to wage a “moral war.” Indeed, 
Roosevelt based both his domestic and foreign policies on the principle that the 
Presidency “is preeminently a place of moral leadership.”68 Thus, the United States 
stockpiled nerve agents, including mustard gas and lewisite, at the Rocky Mountain 
Arsenal during the Second World War, but refrained from using them. Incendiaries 
were another matter. 
While humans first weaponized gas in the late nineteenth century, the history of 
incendiary weapons began in antiquity. As the story goes, sometime between 1400-
1000 BCE, the biblical Samson tied firebrands to the tails of three hundred foxes and set 
them loose against his Philistine enemies. Hundreds of years later, the Assyrians fought 
with flaming arrows and pots filled with fire. The Greeks too experienced the power of 
fire in warfare. In the midst of the Peloponnesian War in 412 BCE, the Syracusans 
filled an old merchant ship with wood, set it aflame, and positioned the vessel so that 
the wind would drift it down towards the Athenian fleet. While the Syracusans hoped 
that the flames would spread to the enemy ships, the Athenians avoided the disaster by 
putting out the blaze as the boat drew near them.69  
In 1943 CE, the CWS at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal drew on a long history of 
weaponizing fire when they mass-produced the M-69 and M-74 incendiary bombs. 
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These weapons were far more sophisticated than Samson’s fire-foxes, the Assyrians’ 
fire-tipped arrows, and the Syracusan’s flaming ship. The active agent in the M-69 and 
M-74 was jellied gasoline, also known as napalm. This substance looked “like mashed 
potatoes well soaked with butter,” had a sticky, rubber cement-like consistency, and 
erupted in flames when ignited.70 The M-74 was far more deadly than the M-69. It 
contained pyrogel, a mixture of napalm and magnesium that made it impervious to 
water when lit. Even members of the CWS did not know how to snuff-out the 
concoction once it ignited. The jelly simply needed to burn itself out. The CWS 
designed the M-69 and the M-74’s delivery methods using the grapeshot principle. This 
meant that workers at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal filled small bomblets with napalm 
and pyrogel, which they then loaded into larger cluster bomb containers. When these 
canisters fell from the sky, they cracked open and scattered dozens of individual 
bomblets on the earth below. After impact, each bomblet spewed its flaming jelly up to 
100 feet in different directions, starting numerous fires.71  
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Figure 2: The Rocky Mountain Arsenal’s Napalm and Incendiary Bomb 
Warehouse and Filling Station in 1943. Pictured are cluster bomb containers. 
Photograph by the U.S. Army. Courtesy of the Library of Congress. 
 
The Rocky Mountain Arsenal shipped environmental destruction abroad in the 
bodies of the bomblets. Because the U.S. Army Air Force (USAAF) dropped bomblets 
on strategic targets—namely cities—these firebombs primarily destroyed built 
environments and ended human lives. When the laborers finished assembling a batch of 
M-69 or M-74 cluster bombs, the CWS transported the completed weapons via the 
railroads, such as the previously mentioned Union Pacific, to military ports. There, 
servicemen carefully loaded them onto carriers that transported them into the European 
and Pacific Theaters. 
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During the Second World War, the United States dropped 38,000 tons of 
incendiary bombs on Germany, many of which came from the Rocky Mountain 
Arsenal.72 The Allied forces used two types of bombing strategies against the Germans. 
The United States followed the “precision” strategy throughout the balance of the 
conflict. Another expression of Roosevelt’s “moral war,” the precision strategy targeted 
power plants, sewer lines, and industries instead of civilian homes and city streets.73 
Along with being a more humane strategy, precision bombing was, according to senior 
military commanders Hap Arnold and Ira Eaker, a “more economical way of reducing a 
large city to the point of surrender.”74  
The British, on the other hand, used the “area” bombing strategy against the 
Germans. Believing that Germany’s bombing of London in August 1940 had freed 
Britain to “take the gloves off,” Sir Charles Portal, then the Chief of the Air Staff of the 
British Royal Air Force (RAF), advocated for a devastating, exhaustive strategic 
bombing program. According to national security policy scholar Tami Biddle, 
“Churchill’s thinking ran along the same lines.” In fact, Churchill initially suggested to 
Portal that the RAF spread its attacks over as many German cities as possible. In 
February 1942, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris took control of the RAF’s Bomber 
Command. Harris believed that area bombing would both psychologically and 
materially devastate Germany, and would quickly end the war entirely on its own. 
Furthermore, according to Biddle, “Harris believed that all the resources—material and 
human—fueling a state’s capacity to wage war were legitimate targets of attack. He did 
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not feel compelled to shroud his work in a guise designed to make it more palatable for 
the public.” Thus, under Harris’s leadership, the RAF indiscriminately bombed major 
German urban centers.75 When the USAAF and the RAF worked together, as they often 
did, their combination of the “precision” and “area” strategies effectively destroyed 
Germany’s built environments and killed thousands of people.  
One of the cities targeted by the USAAF and RAF was Hamburg. Founded by 
Charlemagne in 810 CE, Hamburg was one of the oldest cities in northern Europe. 
During the Second World War, it was the second largest city in Germany, with a 
documented population of 1,150,000 people. Hamburg contained a world-renowned 
zoo, opera, theater, and a series of planned parks and lakes that testified to generous city 
planning. Along with being a cultural center, the city housed countless industries, the 
foreign exchange, insurance companies, custom houses, and banks. Additionally, the 
metropolis was Germany’s largest port, containing twenty-two miles of quays, 110 
miles of docks and landings, as well as four shipbuilding yards.76 Hamburg was an 
important transportation hub for the Third Reich. The city’s networks of canals 
connected to the Elbe River which “flow[ed] to all rivers and corners of Germany.”77 
Overland transportation networks also routed through Hamburg. Like Denver, Hamburg 
was an important war city. Among other items, it manufactured one-quarter of 
Germany’s submarines during the World War II.78  
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On the night of July 24, 1943, the USAAF and RAF launched Operation 
Gomorrah against Hamburg. This joint operation called for alternating USAAF and 
RAF bombing raids. Using the area strategy, in the early hours of July 25, the RAF 
dropped 2,300 tons of bombs on the city in what the Chicago Tribune called the 
“heaviest air attack the world has known.”79 The payload included 350,412 individual 
incendiary devices.80 The ensuing fires across the cityscape burned so high and bright 
that British crews in Ruhr, approximately 200 miles away, stopped in awe of the distant 
hellscape.81 As the historian Keith Lowe recounts, fires across the city that night “were 
so numerous that they sparked off a number of unusual meteorological events.”82 Like a 
self-sustaining generator, the flames created strong winds that fed the fire and carried it 
throughout the city’s built environment. When the bombing ceased that morning, a 
German radio reporter surveyed the damages, noting that the opera house, the state 
library, the theater, and two of Hamburg’s oldest churches, Nikolai and St. George’s, 
had fallen to the flames.83 Later that day, 1,200 U.S. Superfortresses, with the Rocky 
Mountain Arsenal’s wares in tow, dropped incendiaries on the city in “the heaviest 
daylight raid in history.”84 Using the precision strategy, the B-17s bombed Hamburg’s 
southern harbor district. Specifically, the USAAF aimed for the Blohm & Voss 
shipyards and the Klöckner air-engine factory. Despite the USAAF’s emphasis on 
precision bombing, the smoke hanging over the ruined city made exact targeting 
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impossible. Only 60 percent of the B-17s bombed near their intended targets. The 
USAAF took to the skies again on July 26, hoping to add greater precision to its earlier 
efforts. Their targets were the same as the day before, Blohm & Voss, as well as 
Klöckner. Amidst the lingering smoke, the Superfortresses somehow found their marks 
and successfully destroyed the shipyard and the engine works.85 From July 27 through 
August 3, the RAF returned to pummel the city. When the fires finally burned 
themselves out, the German authorities reported that 10,000 people had perished.86 The 
fires destroyed the biological components—the nature—that made up human bodies. 
According to the literary scholar Sven Lindqvist, the “British air attacks on Hamburg 
killed more people than all German air attacks against English cities put together.”87 
The damage to Hamburg’s built environment was extensive. Whole streets, post 
offices, schools, police stations, and stores turned to ash. The city’s great gothic 
churches crumbled. The Hagenbeck Zoo also succumbed to the flames. More than one 
hundred large animals died during the blaze, while dozens of others escaped into the 
ruins of the metropolis.88 Bombings crippled transportation and communication 
systems. The fires melted the city’s telephone system, train stations, railways, and 
bridges. One of Hamburg’s distinctive transportation ways—the Elbe Canal Tunnel, 
which connected the wharfs to the city proper—flooded with seawater after a direct 
hit.89 
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Figure 3: The ruins of Hamburg, July 1943. Photograph courtesy of Keystone 
Images/Getty Images.  
 
Along with destroying the city’s built environment, Operation Gomorrah 
generated a refugee crisis. Thousands of German, Danish, and Swedish men, women, 
and children fled from the northern port city to the nearby Danish border seeking 
sanctuary. On August 1, the Danish Radio reported that “on all the roads leading out of 
Hamburg thousands of evacuees can be seen on foot, cycling, or pushing carts and 
wheelbarrows.” Many left without documents, money, and their personal possessions. 
The refugees brought with them stories of the “inferno.” Some shared how the bombing 
not only flattened the city, but caused a social upheaval. “Hamburg has ceased to exist 
as an organized city,” recalled one refugee. Some debated over how many buildings 
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remained standing. One eyewitness counted fifty, while another said that taking 
inventory of the “maul[ing]” was “impossible.”90  
Weeks after the attack on Hamburg, the Washington Post explained to the 
American people the significance of the raid. “Besides the tremendous material 
devastation visited on the city and its environs,” the reporter Hiram Blauvelt wrote, 
“[the] combined British and American air power has dealt a devastating blow to 
German morale at home and Nazi prestige abroad.” By selecting Hamburg’s built 
environment for “total pulverization” the “Allied High Command gained far beyond the 
concrete returns normally to be achieved by bombings.”91 Indeed, the destruction of the 
city had a psychological effect on the German people and Nazi leadership. In his 
personal journal, the Nazi Propaganda Chief Joseph Goebbels recorded that the 
bombing of Hamburg created “problems that are almost impossible of solution.” The 
Nazi leader strained to find food, clothing, and shelter for “this population of a 
million.”92 Rapt with stress over what he called the “greatest crisis of the war,” 
Goebbels ordered the partial evacuation of Berlin as a precautionary measure.93 
The Rocky Mountain Arsenal’s incendiaries also fell on the German city of 
Dresden in February 1945. The capital of Saxony, Dresden was a cultural mecca known 
for its “artistic treasures.”94 Some regarded the city as the “German Florence,” others 
the “Athens of Germany,” while a few settled for simply calling it the “most beautiful 
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city in Europe.”95 Dresden was home to distinctive theaters, beautiful architecture, 
dozens of historical buildings, and quaint parks. Although often solely remembered for 
its cultural value, Dresden was also a military city.96 During World War II, the 
metropolis served as an administrative and communications depot for the Eastern Front, 
a refuge for Germans fleeing from the Red Army, and home to several war industries.97 
It boasted of an inland harbor, numerous railway maintenance shops, large marshalling 
yards, an iron foundry, engineering and armament industries, chemical and explosive 
factories, and several electronic motor plants. In January 1945, the Red Army was 
quickly closing in on the heartland of Germany, pushing the Eastern Front closer and 
closer to Berlin. At the Yalta Conference in early February, the Allied forces agreed that 
they must stop the Germans from reinforcing the Eastern Front. To accomplish this, the 
USAAF and RAF set their sights on Dresden, the gateway to the East.98  
On February 13, 1945, as the Dresden Frauenkirche’s clock struck 10:09 P.M., 
“hell broke loose” in the city.99 The RAF bombers screamed across the night sky, 
dropping nearly 650,000 incendiaries over the metropolis.100 Following the night-and-
day bombing pattern they used years before in Hamburg, the USAAF razed the city the 
next day with the Rocky Mountain Arsenal’s incendiaries. As it had in Hamburg, the 
                                                 
95 Joseph P. Tustin, Why Dresden Was Bombed: A Review of the Reasons and Reactions (United States 
Air Forces in Europe, 1954), 2; Gladwin Hill, “U.S. Army Disliked in Ruined Dresden,” New York Times, 
3 January 1946. 
96 Nazi Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels was responsible for molding the way the international 
community remembered the firebombing. On March 4, he published “The Death of Dresden, a Beacon of 
Resistance” in a German weekly newspaper. Reprinted countless times, this article recounts how the 
Allies committed “mass-murder” against civilians and a city void of military value. By insisting that 
Dresden was solely an innocent cultural Eden, Goebbels created a narrative of Allied brutality that others, 
including American author Kurt Vonnegut, repeated throughout history. As the historian Frederick Taylor 
put best, this propaganda campaign was Goebbel’s “final, dark masterpiece.” See Taylor, Dresden, 372. 
97 Sebastian Cox, “The Dresden Raids: Why and How,” in Paul Anderson and Jeremy A. Crang, eds. 
Firestorm: The Bombing of Dresden 1945 (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee Press, 2006), 53. 
98 Tustin, Why Dresden Was Bombed, 9, 6-7. 
99 Tustin, Why Dresden Was Bombed, 10. 
100 “Triple Raid on Dresden,” The Manchester Guardian, 15 February 1945. 
43 
USAAF struggled to implement its precision strategy because of the smoke that hung 
over the city. While the first wave of Superfortresses did indeed hit their target, the 
marshalling yards, subsequent groups scattered their payloads all over the city.101  The 
temperature of the ensuing inferno exceeded 1,000º C. The fires claimed many 
Dresdeners. Some fled into cellars only to be crushed by falling debris or suffocated by 
smoke. Others jumped into the city’s water tanks, hoping to prevent their immolation. 
They too perished when the water around them boiled and evaporated.102  
By the time the assault ended on February 15, 1945, the incendiaries had 
destroyed Dresden’s built environment. The fires claimed six square miles of the inner 
city, one-third of the city’s apartments (approximately 75,000 units), 27,000 houses, and 
7,000 public buildings. Hospitals and schools collapsed, the city’s water system failed, 
and public transportation came to a halt. Out of Dresden’s thirty historic and culturally 
significant buildings, eleven crumbled in ruin, and seventeen more sustained damage.103 
Among the buildings damaged were Dresden’s ornate city hall and the Zwinger 
Museum. The baroque Catholic Hofkirche lost it roof in the raid. Consequently, the 
interior of the cathedral filled with shrapnel and falling ash. The sixteenth-century 
Residenz Castle lost everything but its outside walls to the flames. The Opera House 
where Richard Strauss debuted the majority of his operettas also suffered severe 
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damage. The Allies also destroyed their intended targets—Dresden’s industrial centers 
and transportation nodes.104 
 
Figure 4: A view from the tower of city hall, Dresden, February 13, 1945. 
Photograph courtesy of Walter Hahn/AFP/Getty Images. 
 
The human cost of the Dresden firebombing is historically controversial. After 
the inferno swept through the city, Dresdeners spent months searching through the 
debris for loved ones. Because the city was in complete disarray, it was nearly 
impossible to identify and take inventory of the deceased. The exact death toll of the 
Dresden firebombing has shifted over time. Immediately after the raids, some 
Dresdeners claimed the fires took 150,000 people.105 The records of the Dresden Chief 
of Police contain conflicting information. One police report lists 18,375 dead. However, 
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another police report records that 21,271 people were buried and cremated after the 
firebombing.106 Today, there is still a debate about the numbers. More conservative 
historians estimate that the fires ended 25,000 lives.107 
Firebombings were not unique to the European Theater. On the other side of the 
world, the Japanese implemented a similar strategy in their conflict with China. Japan 
and China had competed with each other for East Asian hegemony intermittently for 
hundreds of years. In some cases, these competitions took the form of large-scale 
“world wars,” such as the First Great East Asian War of 1592-1598.108 Running 
concurrently with the Second World War, the Second Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945 
was the latest struggle between Japan and China for regional dominance. Hoping to 
finally break Chinese morale and end Chinese resistance, the Japanese indiscriminately 
bombed urban centers, such as Chongqing, China’s wartime capital. This campaign 
included the use of incendiary weapons. Between 1938 and 1943, Japanese aircraft 
dropped 21,600 bombs on Chongqing.109 This bombardment destroyed approximately 
10,000 homes and killed over 10,000 civilians.110 “No apparent distinction was made 
between civilian or military targets,” writes historian Edna Tow, “both fell victim to 
Japan’s bombers.”111 An eyewitness reported to the Times that “the bombing was the 
worst exhibition of cold-blooded mass murder that the Japanese have so far been able to 
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perpetrate. . . . The areas infected were raging infernos. I never saw anything like it.”112 
By 1943, the Japanese bombers had transformed the entire city into rubble. Despite the 
scale of this destruction, the bombings did not achieve their main objective. China did 
not surrender, nor concede to Japanese demands. Instead of breaking the will of the 
people, the air raids unified the Chinese in Chongqing. They gave civilians and state 
officials a shared sense of hardship and purpose.113  
While the Japanese were busy dropping firebombs on China, the Americans 
were preparing to drop their own incendiaries on Japan. Departing from the precision 
strategy, throughout the spring and summer of 1945 the United States indiscriminately 
dropped the Rocky Mountain Arsenal’s M-69s and M-74s on Tokyo. In the 2003 
documentary The Fog of War, former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara 
illuminated just how the USAAF came to embrace the area bombing strategy in the 
Pacific Theater. As part of the USAAF’s Office of Statistical Control, McNamara—
then a captain in the USAAF—analyzed the efficiency and effectiveness of the B-29 
Pacific bombing campaigns commanded by Major General Curtis LeMay. "LeMay was 
focused on only one thing: target destruction,” McNamara related. “Most Air Force 
generals could tell you how many planes they had, how many tons of bombs they 
dropped . . . but he was the only person I knew in the Senior Commanding Air Force 
that focused solely on the loss of his crews per unit of target destruction." Guided by 
this emphasis, McNamara wrote a report which outlined how flying B-29s at 10,000 
feet reduced their accuracy and made their operations “inefficient.” In light of this and 
other reports from the Office of Statistical Control, LeMay decided to “drastically 
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change” his operations. He began flying his B-29s at 5,000 feet and bomb using 
incendiaries to maximize their efficiency—their destructive power. Without a doubt, 
this strategy contained moral conundrums. As McNamara related, the alternative to 
firebombing was a protracted invasion and the loss of American lives. There was not an 
international rule or law against firebombing, and it indeed was an efficient way to 
destroy enemy infrastructure. Still, LeMay and McNamara both recognized that the 
firebombings were immoral. “LeMay said that if we would have lost the war we all 
would have been prosecuted as war criminals,” McNamara related. “And I think he’s 
right . . . we were behaving as war criminals. . . . But what makes it immoral if you lose 
and not immoral if you win?”114 
While Tokyo weathered firebombing throughout 1945, the air raids on March 9 
and 10, dubbed Operation Meetinghouse by the USAAF, were particularly devestating. 
Years after the bombing, the Tokyo native Tomio Yoshida provided a detailed ground-
level perspective of the destruction. On the night of March 9, in less than one hour, the 
USAAF dropped 690,000 pounds of firebombs on Tokyo. When the teenager Tomio 
and his young sister first heard the air raid alarms sound, they quickly gathered a few 
valuables and fled to the streets. The two hoped to reach the open areas in their 
neighborhood—namely Sarue Park or the lumberyard operated by the Ministry of 
Forestry—believing that the bombers would have no cause to destroy those spaces. 
Shortly after Tomio and his sister took to the streets, they heard “the horrifying roar of 
the low-flying B-29s and the sound of incendiary bombs falling.” As they ran through 
the streets they saw “the oily contents of the bombs ooz[ing] out, carrying flames to 
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everything they touched.” Firefighters tried combatting the fires with water, but because 
“water was no good,” the firefighters “threw aside their buckets and began trying to 
suffocate the flames with clothes and quilts.” Despite the firefighters’ best efforts to 
quell the flames, nothing worked. The fires raged on, spurred by the strong gales. 
People aflame frantically doused themselves with buckets of water, not realizing that 
water only fed the flames. After dodging the flames while racing through the streets, the 
Yoshida siblings reached their destination—the park district. However, they were 
unable to enter into the park. “A ring of burning shops” barricaded their entry. Quickly 
reassessing their situation, the children made way for their backup refuge—the 
lumberyard. However, the lumberyard was also engrossed with flames. Not knowing 
where to hide, the children finally took refuge near a stone wall of a canal.115  
When dawn came and the fires burned out, the Yoshida children left the safety 
of the stone wall and made their way home. This task was nearly impossible. Tokyo had 
become unrecognizable. Wandering through ashes and rubble for “a long time” the 
Yoshida siblings could not find their home. “The neighborhood was a wasteland,” 
Tomio explained. “Not a house remained in the formerly densely built-up region.” 
While searching for their home, and their parents, the children saw dead bodies that 
“littered the streets” charred beyond recognition. The Rocky Mountain Arsenal’s 
incendiaries—militarized fossils fuels—burned and transformed the biological 
elements—the nature—that made up human bodies. Eventually, the children “found the 
place where our house should have been.” Nothing but ashes remained. Afraid and 
alone, the Yoshida children “squatted in the ruins” of their home “with no place to 
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go.”116 That night 87,793 people perished in the flames, 40,918 were injured, and more 
than one million became homeless.117  
 
Figure 5: Tokyo's industrial Nihonbashi District after the firebombing on March 
10, 1945. Photograph by and courtesy of the U.S. Army. 
 
Operation Meetinghouse devastated Tokyo’s built environment. American 
incendiaries turned fifteen square miles of the city into dust.118 In an interview on 
March 11, LeMay said that Operation Meetinghouse “left nothing but twisted, tumbled 
down rubble in its path.” Eight industrial facilities laid in ruins, including the Ueno 
railroad station, the Rising Sun petroleum terminal, the Ogura Oil Company, the Japan 
Machine Industry, and the Maranouchi telephone exchange. Furthermore, the fires 
destroyed hundreds of small businesses, administration buildings, and homes. “There 
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were acres and acres of smoke and flames [across Tokyo],” one B-29 pilot said. “The 
town was burning like hell—and I mean hell.” Another pilot likened Operation 
Meetinghouse to “throwing matches on a floor covered with dry sawdust.”119 A reporter 
with the Boston Globe, Martin Sheridan, recorded that the smoke over Tokyo was so 
thick that it left soot on underside of the fuselage of his plane. The smoke carried with it 
the stench of burning bodies. “I not only saw Tokyo burning,” Sheridan wrote, “I 
smelled it.”120 
The Rocky Mountain Arsenal’s firebombs continued to rain down on Tokyo 
throughout the spring of 1945. In May, the USAAF dropped 3,258 tons of napalm on 
the undamaged parts of the city. As Lindqvist aptly observes, “no one counted the 
human cost anymore; damage was measured in surface area, square miles.” The air 
raids had destroyed 178 square miles of Japan in five months.121  
The Germans and the Japanese were not the only victims of the Rocky Mountain 
Arsenal’s wares during World War II. In the pursuit of producing and exporting 
destruction, the CWS unintentionally harmed its own facilities and workers. While the 
explosions of June 6, 1945, killed and maimed American workers, the fires of June 25, 
1945 and July 27, 1947, torched the Arsenal’s built environment.  
At 6p.m. on June 6, 1945, two M-74 incendiary bomblets reached the end of 
their assembly lines and exploded. Their flaming contents splattered on the bodies of 
workers nearby. Women made up 70 percent of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal’s 
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workforce, and thus, it was statistically not surprising that women suffered from the 
Arsenal’s fires and explosions. Although there is no data on what percentage of the 
workers were Hispanic, several women that the fires and explosions harmed had names 
suggesting Hispanic heritage. One woman, the 21-year-old Nora Ruiz, died from the 
fatal burns she received from the incendiaries. Three other women, Jean Mangledorf, 
Jewel Phillips, and Lila Baca, were seriously injured. Workers quickly rushed to 
smother the flames the best they could and attempted to save the lives of their 
coworkers. Emergency crews quickly transported the injured women to the Fitzsimons 
General Hospital for treatment. It was there that their historical record ends. Two other 
women, Elvira Jacobs and Anne Chavez, received minor burns from the explosions and 
quickly returned to work. The CWS never revealed what triggered the explosions. The 
official statement of the CWS, made by Brigadier General Alexander Wilson, the 
commandant of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal, did not offer any clues as to what caused 
the bomblets to explode.122 The press made no further inquiries. The explosions of June 
6, 1945, like their victims, faded away in the historical record. 
Nineteen days later, on June 25, 1945, a fire broke out at the Rocky Mountain 
Arsenal. The inferno began in an unidentified building. The flames, fanned by high 
winds, quickly spread towards the main incendiary bomb plant just 200 feet away. 
Thankfully, the Denver Fire Department and the Arsenal’s firefighters were able to 
keep the blaze from triggering a larger chemical explosion. To do this, the coalition of 
firemen quickly rearranged the Arsenal’s built environment by moving freight cars on 
the Arsenal’s railway to create a fire-break. The firefighters moved six empty freight 
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cars to the north side of the burning structure, placing them between the fire and the 
chemical weapons plant. After an hour and a half, the firemen brought the blaze to heel. 
By the fire’s end, the blaze had ruined approximately $75,000 worth of materials. 
Thankfully, this fire did not claim any lives. The CWS again did not definitively 
identify the origins of the blaze. They offered two explanations to the press. The first 
explanation detailed that the fire began because of a short circuit in the building’s 
wiring. The second explanation stated that the fire was the result of spontaneous 
combustion.123 Again, just like with the explosions of June 6, reporters did not press the 
issue. The next day, newspapers resumed their coverage of the war in Europe and Asia, 
quietly ending the story of the June 25 inferno. 
Two years later, the Rocky Mountain Arsenal again burst into flames. On the 
night of July 27, 1947, the coal storage area of the Arsenal erupted into a blaze. The fire 
rapidly spread throughout the plants, destroying $150,000 in valuable machinery. By 
the time the Denver Fire Department arrived at the scene, the conflagration neared the 
poisonous chlorine gas tanks. The flames burned so high and bright that they were 
visible from many different spots across the Denver metropolitan area. In fact, residents 
of the Denver area pulled their cars over to watch the inferno light up the night sky. The 
resulting traffic jam took Denver police and state highway patrolmen more than an hour 
to untangle. Back at the Arsenal, firefighters worked on the blaze for more than an hour 
before it was contained. No one was injured or killed. When interviewed the next day 
about the cause of the fire, Colonel Ralph Johnson, the then acting commander of the 
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Arsenal, attributed the flames to “spontaneous combustion.” 124 Once again, the press 
quickly forgot about this issue. The Rocky Mountain Arsenal had a way of avoiding 
scrutiny during the Second World War. After all, its weapons helped make the 
American victory possible.  
 As World War II dovetailed into the Cold War, the military-industrial complex 
also expanded into other front-range cities. Eighty-four miles south of Denver, in 
Colorado Springs, the Air Force burrowed into Cheyenne Mountain. There, it 
established the Air Defense Command (later known as the Aerospace Defense 
Command and the North American Air Defense Command). From its control centers 
deep in the mountain, the Air Force monitored North American airspace for missiles 
and enemy aircraft. It also prepared to coordinate the launch of America’s ICBM cache 
in the event of nuclear war. In short, the Air Defense Command controlled all measures 
of air defense. 125 Indeed, during the Cold War the military-industrial complex brought 
much to the Front Range.  
The Cold War not only changed the Front Range, it transformed the American 
West. As the economist Roger Bolton explains, “changes in the 1950’s had important 
repercussions for regional growth simply because they were large enough to amount to 
significant shifts in demand, and because defense activity is an important source of 
income for certain areas.” International tensions, including the Korean War and the 
threat of nuclear war with the U.S.S.R., spurred a greater demand for missiles, ships, 
and aircraft located along the West Coast of the United States. As a result, defense 
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businesses “fell off” the Old Northwest and Middle Atlantic states and traveled to the 
West.126 Nuclear facilities, shipyards, aircraft manufacturers, and rocket researchers all 
congregated along the Rocky Mountains and the Pacific Ocean.127 They brought with 
them regional growth.128  
Sunbelt states across the South and the Southwest, such as Georgia and Arizona, 
also attracted large industries and experienced an economic boom during the Cold War. 
Sunbelt boosters and politicians, such as Arizona’s Barry Goldwater, harnessed 
government power to create business-friendly environments. These environments 
consisted of low taxes, minimal regulations, and anti-union legislation. “The rise of the 
Sunbelt,” the historian Elizabeth Shermer claims, “makes clear the extent of which 
America’s New Deal moment proved but a transitory and contested episode in the 
construction of late twentieth-century capitalism.” While Shermer’s argument is a bit 
simplistic, there is little doubt that Sunbelt cities such as Phoenix, Arizona, attracted 
large electronics and aerospace firms because local boosters and the Phoenix Chamber 
of Commerce “perfected an anti-New Deal growth politics” that empowered 
businessmen. In short, Sunbelt boosters “redrew the boundaries of American capitalism 
and reoriented American politics toward the idea that the chief purpose of government, 
on both the local and the national level, was to sustain and advance businesses interests 
and those who presided over America’s great corporations.” Of course, in addition to 
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their attractive politics, Sunbelt boosters advertised warm weather and an abundance of 
sunshine.129  
 Even though Denver could not boast of having consistently warm weather, it 
could brag about being “the West’s greatest federal nerve center.”130 Testifying to the 
city’s importance, after the Soviet Union detonated its first atomic bomb in 1949, the 
U.S. federal government designated Denver as an alternative capital of the United States 
in the event of nuclear warfare.131 The Cold War increased the presence of the military-
industrial complex in Denver. For example, in 1956 the Martin Marietta Aerospace 
Corporation (later Lockheed Martin) constructed a plant to manufacture Titan I missiles 
south of Littleton, a suburb of Denver. The Titan I missile program was important to 
both the greater Cold War and the Denver region. After Marietta finished constructing 
the ICBMs, they found their way into missile silos just southeast of the city at Lowry 
Air Force Base. There they waited for the Cold War to become hot. Along with 
Marietta, other large subsidized aerospace and avionic firms opened facilities near 
Denver, including IBM, Honeywell, Sundstrand, Ball Brothers Research, and Beech 
Aircraft.132 The Atomic Energy Commission also took up residence ten miles northwest 
of downtown Denver at the Rocky Flats plant. There it worked alongside the Dow 
Chemical Company to manufacture plutonium triggers for America’s entire nuclear 
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cache.133 By 1980, Denver could boast that it had more than thirty-three thousand 
federal employees—more than any other city in the nation except Washington D.C.134 
Yet when the Second World War ended, so did the mass production of 
weaponry at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal. The CWS, then reorganized into the 
Chemical Corps, placed the Rocky Mountain Arsenal on standby. The military-
industrial complex simply no longer needed to mass-produce incendiary weapons and 
nerve gasses. It would contain communism using other means, including economic, 
political, and psychological pressures, as well as the threat of mutual assured 
destruction.135 No longer needing all of its facilities, the CWS leased a portion of the 
Rocky Mountain Arsenal to two private chemical and pesticide manufacturers: the 
Colorado Fuel & Iron Corporation and the Julius Hyman & Company. These leases 
transformed the Arsenal into a physical manifestation of the military-industrial 
complex. In 1950, Julius Hyman & Company assumed Colorado Fuel & Iron’s lease. 
Then, in 1951, Shell Chemical Company (later Shell Oil Company) bought out Julius 
Hyman and consolidated pesticide manufacturing at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal. Shell 
manufactured pesticides there until 1982.136  
In her monumental work, Silent Spring, Rachel Carson addressed the dangers 
pesticides posed to American society and touched-off a new environmental 
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consciousness in the United States. Hoping to explain what had “silenced the voices of 
spring in countless towns in America,” Carson explored environments across the United 
States that were falling silent to pesticides—and one her examples was the Rocky 
Mountain Arsenal.137 In a few short pages, the patron saint of environmentalism 
described how a wide assortment of chemicals, including chlorides, chlorates, fluorides, 
and arsenic flowed from the Rocky Mountain Arsenal’s waste basins and into the 
region’s groundwater. From there, according to Carson, it sickened livestock, damaged 
crops, and perhaps even harmed humans.138 
 Flawed waste management caused the Arsenal’s wide assortment of chemicals 
to interact with the flora and fauna in the region. The story of waste management at the 
Rocky Mountain Arsenal is a long one. From 1942 to 1946, the Army treated its liquid 
waste, which included industrial chemicals and nerve gas byproducts, with sodium 
hydroxide to dissolve grease, oils, and protein-based liquids. The Army then stored the 
remaining liquid refuse in one of the natural reservoirs on site, which they dubbed Basin 
A. This basin was a depression in the earth approximately 100 acres in size. The idea 
behind this method of storage was that as the liquid waste pooled in the basin, it would 
slowly evaporate over time.139 However, the military produced waste much faster than 
the refuse could vaporize. When Basin A began to overflow in 1946, the military 
directed its liquid refuse into another reservoir, Basin B. When Shell joined the Army at 
the Arsenal in 1951, it also stored its liquid waste in the basins. As the years went on, 
the military designated more natural waste basins to keep up with the high amount of 
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waste both it and Shell generated. In 1956, the Chemical Corps and Shell had moved to 
their sixth waste reservoir, Basin F.140  
 
Figure 6: Aerial View of Basin A circa 1970. Photograph by the U.S. Army. 
Courtesy of the Library of Congress. 
 
 The basin method, however, failed to confine liquid refuse. Pollutants leached 
into the sandy soil, and quickly dispersed throughout the region. Throughout Shell’s 
tenure at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal, the company released an estimated 136,000 tons 
of contaminants into the surrounding environment. Four of the many pesticides that 
leached out of the basins were DDT, dieldrin, aldrin, and endrin. These organochlorine 
chemicals work by attacking the nervous system of insects and mammals, causing 
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“disorientation, emaciation, and eventually death.”141 When these substances traveled 
through the soil, they found their way into the bodies of rodents and other small 
animals. Once there, they not only transformed the bodies and lives of these creatures—
they also entered the food chain. 
 The waste basins were not the only lakes on the Arsenal grounds. Workers at the 
Arsenal dammed three other reservoirs to create the Upper Derby, Lower Derby, and 
Ladora lakes. 142 These lakes collected run-off and irrigation water from the area which 
Shell then pumped and recycled through its chemical plants to cool machinery. During 
the winter months, each of these lakes attracted migratory waterfowl to their shores.143  
 Responding to local complaints that the Arsenal was harming the region’s 
wildlife, in May 1952 the biologist George M. Sciple of the Wildlife Research 
Laboratory in Denver conducted a field epidemiological survey of avian mortality on 
the grounds of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal. While walking through the land, Sciple 
and his team found “many dead and dying birds on the water and along the shorelines” 
of the Upper Derby, Lower Derby, and Ladora lakes. They also found “many more 
carcasses . . . far out in the surrounding grasslands and fields.” When they looked up 
into the sky, they saw birds overhead “go into convulsions and fall while in flight.” In 
their report, the surveyors recorded the characteristics of the sickened birds: 
The individual duck would sit quietly on the bank when approached closely by 
the observer. Its only movements would be an unusual repetitive “feeding” 
tremor of the mandibles and a coarse tremor of the head and neck. Depending 
upon the severity of the symptoms, the bird would either allow itself to be 
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picked up without a struggle or would suddenly become alert as the observer 
came within a few feet of it. In the first situation, the duck seemed unable to 
coordinate muscular activity and could not escape. In the second situation, the 
bird apparently had a greatly reduced sensorium and was unable to respond 
except to the strongest stimuli. These latter birds, once they became alerted, 
would fly up strongly as the observer approached within 4-5 feet of them. They 
would rise sharply, but as an altitude of perhaps 50-75 feet was gained, the 
ducks would go into violent convulsions and fall back into the water.  
 
At the conclusion of the study, Sciple and his team estimated that 1,200 ducks died 
during the few months the biologists surveyed the area.144 On May 28, 1952, Sciple 
submitted his study to the Julius Hyman Company, the Colorado Department of Game 
and Fish, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, and the Commanding Officer of the 
Rocky Mountain Arsenal.145 In his conclusion, Sciple noted that “it seems indicated that 
the avian mortality occurring on Upper Derby, Lower Derby, and Ladora Lakes is 
related etiologically to a surface-borne agent, or agents, toxic to the central nervous 
system.” He continued, “Though not yet proven, it is believed probable that this surface 
agent is contained in an oily scum which entered the lakes through a process-water 
drain from the plant area.”146 
 In 1955, other biologists associated with the Wildlife Research Laboratory 
trekked through the fields and brush around the Rocky Mountain Arsenal. They took 
field notes as well as collected tissue samples from the dead animals they encountered. 
They then sent this data to the Communicable Disease Center (CDC) in Savannah, 
Georgia, for analysis. Out of all the tests conducted by the CDC, one troubled the 
scientists more than the rest. After carefully dissecting and testing the fatty tissue and 
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liver of a dead duck, the CDC found that it contained “large amounts of dieldrin,” a 
pesticide manufactured at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal.147  
 In April 1959, Robert B. Finley, Jr., a research biologist with the Wildlife 
Research Laboratory, followed up on these studies. Finley and his team scoured the 
grounds surrounding the Rocky Mountain Arsenal, made field observations, as well as 
collected samples of water, mud, vegetation, and dead birds. Finley’s group was 
primarily interested in waterfowl mortality around the Upper Derby, Lower Derby, and 
Ladora lakes. However, waterfowl were not the only animals dying in suspicious 
numbers. Both scientists and workers at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal recorded seeing 
dead pheasants, songbirds, muskrats, rabbits, and frogs around the shorelines of the 
lakes. While walking along the Ladora shore on April 17, 1959, Finley and his group 
found “a total of 119 dead birds and animals.” They included “94 ducks of 9 species, 6 
coots, 2 pheasants, 7 muskrats, 4 rabbits, and 6 frogs.” Finley hypothesized that “if the 
94 ducks all died within the preceding week, and if this mortality rate was typical for a 
4-month period, January-April, the losses for this period would be approximately 1,500 
ducks around Ladora Lake alone.” While the Finley group trudged through the Arsenal 
grounds, they crossed paths with a Shell employee who was assigned to “periodically” 
gather up dead ducks around the property and bury them. With a gunny sack filled with 
dead ducks in his hands, the man disclosed to the researchers that during the first three 
months of 1959 he had collected “20 gunny sack of ducks, 25 birds to a sack, or a total 
of 500 ducks.” Based off this information, Finley made a “conservative estimate” that 
2,000 ducks per year might have died from the “toxic contamination of these three 
lakes.” However, Finley also recognized that calculating the number of waterfowl killed 
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was “difficult to estimate because of the transient and constantly changing nature of the 
migratory duck population.” In other words, birds could have acquired toxins from the 
Arsenal and flown elsewhere to sicken and die. “Therefore,” Finley wrote, “counts of 
birds found dead around the three lakes represent the minimum losses and provide a 
basis for rough estimates of additional mortality.”148 
 After observing that the Upper Derby, Lower Derby, and Ladora lakes lacked 
the amphibian populations common in the Denver area—leopard and chorus frogs—
Finley and his associates conducted simple bioassay experiments in their laboratory to 
determine if the lakes’ toxicity was to blame. This experiment consisted of raising 
tadpoles in four distinctive aquaria environments. One aquarium served as a control, the 
other three as tests. Each aquarium held both leopard and chorus frog tadpoles. The 
scientists filled the first aquarium with uncontaminated pond water and algae, as well as 
added mud they collected from Upper Derby Lake. Eleven days later, all twenty-five 
tadpoles in the first aquarium were dead.” The scientists left mud out of the second 
aquarium, filled it with uncontaminated pond water, and fed the tadpoles algae from 
Upper Derby Lake. Twelve days later, all forty-two tadpoles in the second aquarium 
were dead. The scientists also left mud out of the third aquarium, filled it with water 
collected from the Upper Derby Lake and fed the tadpoles uncontaminated algae. Forty-
nine days later, all fifty tadpoles in the third aquarium were dead. The control aquarium 
held sixty-six tadpoles, uncontaminated pond water, and uncontaminated algae. Fifty-
one days later, all of the control tadpoles were dead. Although the control bioassay was 
“crude,” Finley still maintained that this bioassay “showed that the survival of tadpoles 
in water alone from Upper Derby Lake was almost as good as survival in the control 
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water.” However, the algae and mud from Upper Derby Lake were toxic enough to kill 
tadpoles within 2 weeks.149 The problem with Upper Derby Lake, then, was not in the 
water but in the soil. 
 Because the solubility of aldrin and dieldrin is low, they are readily absorbed 
and held in soil. As Finley explained, mud “acts as a great reservoir holding large 
quantities of insecticides for long periods.” Along with the tadpole experiment, Finley’s 
group analyzed mud taken from the inlet canal that fed into the Upper Derby Lake. 
They found that it was “very heavily loaded with dieldrin” containing 440 parts-per-
million (ppm) of the chemical. Smaller concentrations of insecticides were also present 
in the mud taken from the outlets of the Upper Derby and Lower Derby Lakes. “It 
seems clear,” Finley recorded, “that the mud deposits of the three lakes have become 
charged with [aldrin and dieldrin] brought into the lakes by the effluent canal from the 
chemical plant and that the mud, over a long period of time, releases small amount of 
toxicants to the water and living organism.”150 
 Next, Finley and his group conducted a series of chemical analyses on three of 
the dead ducks they found at Ladora Lake. They found that each duck carcass held 
dieldrin.151 To contextualize this finding, Finley noted a few studies that linked aldrin 
and dieldrin to duck mortality. In 1952, the Bureau of Entomology and Plant 
Quarantine, the United States Department of Agriculture, and the Wyoming Department 
of Agriculture attempted to control the grasshopper population by spraying 300,000 
acres of Wyoming range land with aldrin, two ounces to the acre. The day before 
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dusters sprayed the reservoir with aldrin, researchers saw a merganser and recorded that 
it “appeared to be healthy.” Two days after spraying, researchers found the merganser 
lying dead near the reservoir. When scientists analyzed its carcass, they found that its 
brain contained 31ppm of aldrin, it kidney 24, and its liver 4ppm.152 The other study 
that Finley consulted was a 1956 report titled Pesticides: Their Use and Toxicity in 
Relation to Wildlife by the zoologists Robert L. Rudd and Richard E. Genelly of the 
University of California, Davis. In that study, Rudd and Genelly investigated and 
recorded “the high toxicity of some chemicals” that the American people routinely used 
as pesticides. Four of the chemicals included in their report were aldrin, dieldrin, endrin, 
and DDT. Pertinent to Finley’s research, Rudd and Genelly noted that mourning doves 
could not detect aldrin in their food and that ingesting 12.5ppm of the chemical resulted 
in their mortality. Additionally, in their bobwhite quail report, the scientists recorded 
that “all quail fed 0.001 percent aldrin . . . died within eight days.”153 Using these 
studies along with his own bioassays, Finley ended his report by “support[ing] the 
conclusion that [the Arsenal’s ducks] were killed by aldrin or dieldrin or both.”154 
 As the years went on, pesticides continued to poison the area’s wildlife. Reports 
of dead ducks, fish, and birds continued throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. Along 
with waterfowl, birds of prey seemed to be the most susceptible to the toxins. When 
hawks, for example, ingested prairie dogs or other small animals who lived in 
contaminated soil, they accumulated toxins in their bodies.155 In 1983, workers at the 
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Rocky Mountain Arsenal collected twelve ill birds. After the birds succumbed to death, 
scientists dissected their bodies searching for contamination clues. Their brains 
contained pesticide organochlorine residues, including dieldrin and endrin.156 The next 
year, the Army’s Division of Wildlife examined the carcasses of numerous animals at 
the Rocky Mountain Arsenal looking for more signs of contamination. Out of the fifteen 
pheasant corpses they examined, seven contained dieldrin and two endrin. When they 
examined the bodies of fifteen ducks, they found that ten held dieldrin, one endrin, one 
DDT, and six DDE.157 The breast meat of eight mourning doves also contained dieldrin, 
one held endrin, and one DDT.158  
Birds were not the only ones affected by the organochlorines. Mammals and fish 
also fell to poisoning. In 1984, the Army’s Division of Wildlife found that out of the 
fifteen cottontail rabbit carcasses they studied, five held dieldrin. Walking along the 
shorelines of the Arsenal’s lakes, workers gathered 117 dead fish, including catfish, 
bluegill, bass, pike, and bullhead. Nearly all of them contained one or more of the 
previously mentioned toxins.159 Autopsies of a dead coyote and a dead badger in 1989, 
revealed that their livers contained “an elevated concentration of the pesticide 
dieldrin.”160  
The mortality caused by the Arsenal’s pesticides was extensive, yet the 
Arsenal’s environmental consequences were not confined to the biological world. 
According to the Denver Post, on August 7, 1971, at 11:22 P.M., Mrs. Wendt of 1725 
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Williams Street, Denver, watched in horror as her “kitchen floor just rolled” beneath 
her. Quickly examining the room around her, Mrs. Wendt saw the kitchen table shake 
and braced herself, fearing that the walls would fall down on her. Six miles to her 
northeast, at 3040 West Virginia Avenue, the shaking earth threw Jesse Herrera out of 
his bed. Minutes later the police department switchboards all across the metropolitan 
area—from Westminster, Northglenn, and Commerce City to Arvada and Thornton—lit 
up with calls from concerned citizens. That night, an earthquake measuring 4.25 on the 
Richter scale rocked the region.161  
Historically, Colorado had only recorded a handful of earthquakes prior to the 
1960s. The first known earthquake to hit Colorado happened on December 7, 1870. 
Later, in 1882, an earthquake measuring 6.6 on the Richter scale, the largest in the 
city’s history, shook Denver. Other quakes struck the state in 1901, 1944, 1955, and 
1960.162 The earthquake that shook the city on the night of August 7, 1971, was 
different from these quakes. The source of this quake, according to scientists, was the 
Rocky Mountain Arsenal.163 
Responding to complaints of animal mortality, and realizing that the basin 
method did not offer a long-term solution to waste management, the Chemical Corps 
drilled a deep waste well into the Earth in 1961. The idea here was to pump hazardous 
liquid refuse deep into the Earth, which would prevent it from contaminating flora and 
fauna, as well as eliminate the need for more basins.164 The hole cut through 
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approximately 11,936 feet of horizontal sedimentary rocks in the Denver basin and 
emptied into Precambrian crystalline rocks, approximately 12,044 feet in the earth.165 
As the drill made its way through the Precambrian rocks, it burrowed through a layer of 
“bright green weathered schist” that occupied the space 11,950 to 11,970 feet below the 
surface, and emptied into a “highly fractured hornblende granite gneiss containing 
pegmatite intrusions” from 11,970 feet to the bottom of the hole.166 It was this layer of 
fractured rock that bore the burden of holding the injected waste, and gave way as 
pressure grew overtime.  
The Chemical Corps began injecting chemical waste into the fractured gneiss 
beginning on March 8, 1962.167 This process would prove the wisdom offered by Joel 
Tarr to be true: some substances placed in sinks interact “with other substances to 
produce serious nuisance.”168 Six weeks after injection began, on April 24, 1962, 
seismographs at the Colorado School of Mines at Bergen Park, and at Regis College in 
Denver, recorded earthquake activity northeast of the city.169 For the next three years, 
the Chemical Corps pumped waste into the earth, the seismographs documented 
movement, and the greater Denver metropolitan area shook.170  
It did not take long for scientists on the Front Range to investigate the new 
seismic activity. Father Joseph V. Downey, a Jesuit Priest and the director of Regis 
College Seismological Observatory, was the first to suggest that the earthquakes were 
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possibly related to the Arsenal’s waste well.171 Other scientists developed different 
explanations. A graduate student at the Colorado School of Mines, Yung-Liang Wang, 
compiled all of the recent seismographic data for the Denver region in his doctorate 
dissertation in 1965. He found that many of the earthquake hypocenters clustered near 
Derby, a suburb on the western border of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal, and were 
located within the Precambrian layer of the Earth’s crust.172 Instead of linking the 
earthquakes with the injection well, Wang suspected that “normal faulting” in fractured 
Precambrian earth “may be the main cause of these Derby earthquakes.”173 
Furthermore, Wang concluded that this “faulting process is compatible with the 
proposition that the Laramide Orogeny,” the historical process that raised the Rocky 
Mountains, “is still continuing.”174 
While Wang was still in the process of completing his dissertation, the 
independent geologist David M. Evans began theorizing that earthquakes plaguing the 
Denver area were human induced. In November 1965, Evans presented his theory that 
the Rocky Mountain Arsenal injection well generated seismic activity to several local 
geological societies. While the majority of his audience questioned his theory, a few 
convinced him to broadcast his ideas to the public. By early 1966, Denverites could see 
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Evans on their local news programs, hear him on the radio, and read him in 
newspapers.175  
Responding to the public stir Evans created, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
along with the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) launched an “investigation to calculate 
Evans theory.”176 In December 1965, the USGS, in conjunction with the Colorado 
School of Mines, Regis College in Denver, and the University of Colorado, set up a 
“very dense network” of seismograph stations near the Rocky Mountain Arsenal to 
locate the epicenters of the earthquakes.177 This consisted of eight small arrays near the 
injection well. Each array “consisted of six vertical seismometers at half-kilometer 
intervals, arranged in an L-shaped pattern, and two horizontal seismometers located at 
one of the vertical-seismometer positions.” In January and February of 1966 these 
seismometers documented “between one and five earthquakes large enough to be 
located” each day. Their findings placed sixty-two of the quakes in an ellipsoidal zone 
around the Rocky Mountain Arsenal’s injection well.178  
The USGS concluded that “the pumping of waste fluids into a deep disposal 
well at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal near Denver appears to be a significant cause of a 
series of minor earthquakes that have occurred just north of Denver since the spring of 
1962.”179 Recognizing the geological consequences of injecting liquid waste into the 
earth, the Chemical Corps slowly culled the volume and pressure of waste injected into 
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the well. Then, on February 20, 1966, it permanently shut the well down and returned to 
the basin method.180 
Later that year, the Rocky Mountain Arsenal was the topic of two articles 
published in scholarly journal The Mountain Geologist. The more significant of the two 
was the study published by Evans. In his article, Evans presented data that showed that 
the amount of waste the Arsenal injected into the earth correlated with the frequency of 
the earthquakes. When the Arsenal temporarily paused injections from October 1963 
through August 1964, Evans’s data showed that seismic activity in the region dropped. 
Additionally, the figures that Evans compiled placed the epicenters of “the majority of 
these earthquakes . . . within a five-mile radius of the Arsenal well.”181 In the second 
article, George E. Bardwell, a scholar from the University of Denver, ran a statistical 
analysis of the relationship between the Rocky Mountain Arsenal well and the 
frequency of earthquakes in the Denver area. He determined that the probability of 
seismic activity increasing due to “random fluctuation is about 1 in 1,000.”182  
The official monthly publication of the American Geological Institute, 
Geotimes, also published some of Evans’s findings in 1966.183 In “Man-made 
Earthquakes in Denver,” Evans explained how the liquid waste induced the quakes. “As 
fluid was injected into the Precambrian reservoir,” Evans wrote, “the fluid pressure 
adjacent to the well bore rose, and the frictional resistance along the fracture planes was 
thereby reduced. When, finally, enough fluid pressure exerted over enough area, 
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movement occurred. The elastic energy released was recorded as an earthquake.”184 For 
Evans, then, the liquid waste accumulated in fractures of the Precambrian rocks until 
the built-up pressure necessitated movement. 
The notion that human activity induced earthquakes shook up the scientific 
community. In 1968, Science published an article titled, “The Denver Earthquakes,” 
written by the earth scientists J.H. Healy, W.W. Rubey, D.T. Griggs, and C.B. Raleigh. 
In it, the authors analyzed the data collected by the Colorado schools, Evans, and the 
USGS, as well as offered their own conclusions. After careful inspection, the scientists 
“consider[ed] the possibility of a coincidental occurrence of earthquakes with the onset 
of fluid injection at Denver to be remote.” They also suggested that “it might be 
possible to reduce the size and number of the earthquakes by removing substantial 
quantities of fluid from the reservoir.” Yet, Healy and his coauthors realized that testing 
their hypothesis “may prove prohibitively expensive.” Considering cost, they 
hypothesized that “given sufficient time, the pore pressure in the focal zone will 
dissipate naturally, and it is hoped that, as the zone of high pressure spreads outward 
from the well, the maximum pressures in the reservoir will fall below the level required 
to trigger seismic activity.” However, the authors did not know how much time the 
dissipation process would require. Thus, despite the high costs, Healy and his group 
ultimately recommended that the military drill a second well to remove the fluid from 
the earth in order to prevent future earthquakes.185 The military, however, did not follow 
this suggestion. 
                                                 
184 Evans, “Man-made Earthquakes in Denver,” 16. 
185 Healy et al., “The Denver Earthquakes,” 1309, 1310. 
72 
Despite the conclusions drawn by Evans, the USGS, and Healy’s group, one 
scientist at the Colorado School of Mines, Ruth B. Simon, insisted that the earthquakes 
had nothing to do with the Arsenal. In writing her 1969 Science article, “Seismicity of 
Colorado,” Simon borrowed tools from the history discipline by collecting nineteenth-
century newspapers from the Denver area that documented earthquake activity. By 
doing so, she found that “earthquakes had occurred in the same regions of western 
Colorado, the Arkansas and Platte River valleys, for nearly one hundred years despite 
the increasing cultural effects of mining, highway construction, reservoir building, and 
loading.” Drawing on these historical supports, Simon argued that “it appears 
unnecessary to explain the Denver earthquakes in terms of pressure induced by the 
introduction of waste fluid.” Instead, Simon put forth that the earthquakes that shook 
Denver in the 1960s demonstrated that the area contained preexisting tectonic strains 
that had gone unnoticed for decades.186  
A year later, the geologist Edwin Karp of New York University took issue with 
Simon’s conclusion. Writing in Science, Karp argued Simon’s work of being 
“extremely misleading.” While Karp yielded to Simon that the “present-day broad 
patterns of seismicity in Colorado agree with those deduced from historical records,” he 
also recognized that Simon’s data “also indicate[d] that very numerous . . . earthquakes 
in the Denver area began at the time waste fluid was first injected at the Arsenal well.” 
In short, Karp used the historical evidence Simon gathered against her. By juxtaposing 
Simon’s evidence with the contemporary quakes he concluded that the “frequency of 
seismic events and the resultant concentration of energy release are not in accord with 
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historical records.” Going further, Karp maintained that Simon’s data did not discredit 
Evans and Healy’s findings. Rather, he claimed that Simon “substantiate[d]” their work 
by showing how “waste fluid pressures appear[ed] to have been a necessary element in 
the initiation of the Denver earthquakes.”187 
Simon responded to Karp’s argument with three points that she believed 
distanced the earthquakes from the injection well. First, she turned against the historical 
records that provided her initial position. Challenging the idea that the high frequency 
of earthquakes was a new phenomenon, she argued that since there were no 
seismograph stations with “sensitive, matched, short-period instruments” near Denver 
between 1882 and 1962, there was no way of knowing the frequency of seismic activity 
during that period. Second, Simon pointed out that only “smaller earthquakes” were 
located near the injection wellhead. The larger ones had documented epicenters south of 
the well and therefore, Simon concluded, were not associated with it. Simon ended her 
rebuttal with her strongest point: although the military stopped injecting waste in 1966, 
the earthquakes continued. Data collected from seismographs and newspaper reports 
from around the Front Range collaborated this point.188  
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Table 2: Magnitude and Quantity of Earthquakes in the Denver Area,  
1959-1967 189 
 
     Magnitude 
Year 1.5-
1.9 
2.0-
2.4 
2.5-
2.9 
3.0-
3.4 
3.5-
3.9 
4.0-
4.4 
4.5-
4.9 
5.0-
5.4 
Total 
1959         0 
1960         0 
1961         0 
1962 72 29 4 2 1 1   189 
1963 89 34 9 3 1 1   284 
1964 26 8 3      72 
1965 168 64 25 6 4    550 
1966 61 18 3 2 1    186 
1967 62 29 15 4 4 2  3 306 
Total 478 182 62 17 11 4  3 1584 
 
Earthquakes continued to haunt the Denver area for decades to come.190 Even 
though Simon insisted that this meant the injection well was not to blame, other 
scientists did not rule out injection as their source. Evans, as well as Healy and his 
coauthors, identified that seismic activity would lag behind the operation of the well.191 
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In short: shutting down the well did not remove the 165,000,000 gallons of liquid waste 
that still pressurized the Precambrian gneiss.  
This pressure continued to be released over time in the form of earthquakes. On 
April 10, 1967, a quake measuring 5.0 on the Richter scale shattered 118 windowpanes 
at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal and cracked parking lots and roads as far west as 
Boulder. Fearing for the safety of their students, the Boulder schools dismissed classes 
for the day. Back in Denver, legislators in the Capitol Building rushed away from 
tremoring chandeliers, fearing that they would come tumbling down onto them. 
Seventeen days later, a 4.4 quake broke walls and ceiling tiles in Boulder. On August 9, 
1967, a 5.3 earthquake drummed through the city. The damage was widespread but not 
devastating. In the suburb of Northglenn, the quake rattled a church, breaking twenty 
windows and cracking concrete pillars. Light fixtures fell from nearby school ceilings. 
Around the suburb, homeowners reported cracks in their walls, ceilings, floors, patios, 
and sidewalks. The USGS recorded more earthquakes on November 14, 15, and 25, 
1967. A 5.2 earthquake boomed through the earth on November 26, 1967. People as far 
north as Laramie, Wyoming, east as Goodland, Kansas, and as far south as Pueblo, 
Colorado, felt the earth shake underfoot. Earthquakes continued to rock the greater 
Denver area until seismic activity slowed down in 1981.192   
 This history of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal during World War II and the Cold 
War provides two important lessons. First, although many outside of Denver have never 
heard of the facility, it exported destruction around the globe. Second and most 
important, the Rocky Mountain Arsenal reminds us that the military-industrial 
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complex’s ecological footprint was not limited to battlefields. When the military-
industrial complex came to Denver it brought with it economic prosperity and 
environmental degradation. The Rocky Mountain Arsenal’s pesticides poisoned wildlife 
northeast of Denver, and its search for the ultimate sink generated earthquakes that 
rocked the greater Denver metropolitan area. During the latter years of the Cold War, 
the Chemical Corps phased out weapon production at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal in 
favor of demilitarization.193 By 1982, both weapon and pesticide production at the 
Rocky Mountain Arsenal had ended.194 However, the military-industrial complex 
continued to dominate Denver’s environment after the Arsenal closed. That story is the 
subject of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 2: A Military-Industrial Cleanup 
On Friday, October 9, 1992, President George H.W. Bush addressed his usual 
cadre of journalists and photographers in the White House. In front of the commander-
in-chief sat a stack of papers and a line of pens. With his back slightly hunched forward, 
President Bush dryly, yet gladly addressed the nation: “I am pleased to sign into law 
H.R. 1435, the ‘Rocky Mountain Arsenal National Wildlife Refuge Act of 1992.’ This 
Act provides for the future establishment of a national wildlife refuge at the Rocky 
Mountain Arsenal immediately outside of Denver, Colorado.” Less than a month before 
the American people voted him out of office, President Bush signed into law a 
bipartisan plan to transform a polluted landscape into a national treasure.195  
 After decades of manufacturing pesticides and munitions, the Arsenal’s primary 
mission changed to demilitarizing war materials under the Nixon Administration in 
1971. Later, in 1982, both the Army and Shell ended all production at the Rocky 
Mountain Arsenal.196  That same year, the Army, Shell, the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), and the Colorado Department of Health began investigating 
the effects military pollutants and industrial pesticides had on the land.197 Under the 
Superfund Act of 1984, Army personnel traversed the Arsenal lands wearing “moon 
suits” and collected samples for laboratory analysis.198 In November 1986, eight months 
before the federal government designated the Arsenal as a Superfund site, workers 
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spotted twenty bald eagles roosting on Arsenal land.199 These birds of prey would prove 
the wisdom that the historian Lisa Brady offered in her monograph, War upon the Land, 
to be true. Nature is “more than mere victim, nature is an active force in human 
affairs.”200  
The presence of the eagles spurred several groups to action. In 1989, the U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service moved quickly to establish a substation at the Arsenal to aid 
in protecting the eagles and the 130 other species of wildlife on the land.201 That same 
year, the photographers Wendy Shattil and Bob Rozinski journeyed onto the grounds of 
the military complex to see the bald eagles for themselves.202 To their surprise, they 
found a variety of animals inhabiting the environment. They snapped photographs 
documenting the presence of deer, prairie dogs, and a wide assortment of birds, 
including bald eagles. The ensuing newspaper articles and photograph collections 
excited both local residents and environmentalists across the nation.203 “When I first 
came out here,” Shattil told the New York Times, “I half expected to find birds that 
glowed in the dark.” Instead, she found a “diversity and quantity of wildlife” that, in her 
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words, rivaled “Yellowstone National Park.”204 Shattil and Rozinski’s pictures of bald 
eagles roosting on the Arsenal’s trees, a western meadowlark perched on top of a sign 
reading “U.S. ARMY MILITARY RESERVATION NO TRESPASSING,” and a group 
of mule deer taking shelter in an abandoned Army shed, sparked hope that “nature” 
would “heal.”205 They also inspired humans to try their hand at transforming “the most 
polluted square mile on Earth” into the “Central Park of the West.”206 
 The Arsenal’s remediation from Superfund site to National Wildlife Refuge 
became law on October 9, 1992, when President Bush’s signature transformed H.R. 
1435 into Public Law No. 102-402.207 The law assigned the Secretary of the Army to 
remediate the portions of the Arsenal grounds that suffered from contamination. As 
sections of the land completed remediation, the law directed the War Department to 
transfer them to the Department of the Interior. Finally, the law assigned the 
Department of the Interior to establish a national wildlife refuge on the property it 
received.208  
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As part of the remediation process, the Army established the Rocky Mountain 
Arsenal Restoration Advisory Board (RAB) in 1994. This organization was an 
extension of the Department of Defense’s Technical Review Committee (TRC) concept. 
United States Code 2705 provided for the creation of TRCs or site-specific RABs “to 
review and comment on Department of Defense actions and proposed actions with 
respect to releases or threatened releases of hazardous substances at installations.” TRC 
and RAB membership was to consist of at least one representative from the Department 
of Defense, the EPA, State and local authorities, and the public.209 Accordingly, the 
Rocky Mountain Arsenal’s RAB was comprised of residents from Denver’s northern 
suburbs, including, Brighton, Commerce City, and Montbello, as well as representatives 
from the Remediation Venture Office (RVO). The RVO was a manifestation of the 
military-industrial complex. It consisted of officials from the U.S. Army, Shell Oil 
Company (Shell Chemical’s successor), and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.210 
 
Figure 7: RAB and RVO membership. Figure by the author. 
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  While the RVO planned and implemented remediation, the RAB was to 
monitor and provide input to guide the process.211 Throughout remediation, local actors 
and environmentalists who sat on the RAB took their role seriously, and presented their 
concerns that remediation was not going far enough. Chiefly, these locals were worried 
about the presence of diisopropyl methylphoshonate (DIMP) in the region’s 
groundwater. They believed that this chemical caused them physical harm and that the 
RVO’s methods of treating DIMP pollution did not thoroughly address the plume that 
had traveled off-site and towards the South Platte River. In the end, the RVO listened to 
these concerns, but it did not heed them. In effect, the RAB was a sham. The input from 
residents did not guide the course of remediation. Just as it had during the Cold War, the 
military-industrial complex dominated this land. The history of remediating the Rocky 
Mountain Arsenal is not a story of locals working with the federal government to 
redeem the land. It is a story of a military-industrial cleanup. 
The Rocky Mountain Arsenal’s RAB was not the only citizen advisory board to 
monitor military Superfund sites in the American West. Jennifer Ohayon examines the 
RABs associated with two Superfund sites in California—Hunters Point Naval Shipyard 
and Fort Ord—in her publication “Addressing Environmental Risks and Mobilizing 
Democracy?” She concludes that RABs were not “meaningful vehicles for public 
participation,” and were “not necessarily democratic.” In the case of Hunters Point, 
some members of the San Francisco community disagreed with the course of 
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remediation implemented by the Navy. Tensions ran so high that environmentalists, 
anglers, and members of the RAB sued the Navy in 1994 “for nineteen thousand 
violations of the Clean Water Act.” Members of Fort Ord’s RAB also sued the Army 
for burying lead-contaminated soil in an on-site landfill, and later filed another lawsuit 
against the Army for violating CERCLA standards. The military disbanded the RABs at 
both Hunters Point and Fort Ord after their monthly meetings turned hostile.212 Thus, 
the failure of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal’s RAB to effect change was not exceptional.  
The Cold War left a “toxic cocktail” in the soil at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal. 
DIMP was just one of the 666 chemicals that the military-industrial complex left in the 
land.213 DIMP is a chemical byproduct of sarin nerve gas.214 From 1953 to 1957 the 
Army manufactured sarin at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal, and from 1973 to 1975 it 
demilitarized the nerve gas. The Army produced DIMP in both manufacturing and 
demilitarizing sarin. When the Army pooled DIMP, along with the rest of its liquid 
waste, in earthen reservoirs on site, it failed to take the necessary precautions to prevent 
DIMP to seep into the saturated alluvium soil and begin moving downslope towards the 
South Platte River with the flow of the region’s groundwater.215 
The Army initially detected DIMP in the Arsenal’s groundwater in 1974. It first 
identified the chemical in surface water draining from a marshy bog on the northern 
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boundary of the Arsenal, far from the waste reservoirs. To stop this water from traveling 
beyond the Arsenal’s borders, the Army began pumping water from the bog into the 
only waste reservoir lined with asphalt, Basin F.216 The idea behind this measure was 
that the asphalt lining of Basin F would prevent the chemical from entering the soil and 
mixing with the groundwater. Following DIMP’s trail from the bog, the Army found 
that the chemical had traveled downslope as far away as seven miles northwest of the 
disposal ponds, past the Arsenal’s borders, and was within one mile of two wells in “the 
city of Brighton’s municipal well field.”217 Later that year, the Colorado Department of 
Health detected DIMP nearly three miles downstream from the Arsenal in a well near 
the City of Brighton.218 Although the concentration of DIMP in this well was 
comparatively small, 0.57 parts-per-billion (ppb), it nonetheless troubled the State.219 In 
response to these findings, the Colorado Department of Health issued a Cease and 
Desist Order against the Rocky Mountain Arsenal and Shell on April 7, 1975. These 
orders directed the Arsenal and Shell to “immediately stop the off-post discharge of 
DIMP,” submit a plan of action to “preclude such future off-post discharge,” and 
develop and follow a surveillance plan to verify these actions.220  
To fulfill these obligations, the Army contacted the U.S. Geological Survey 
(USGS) to evaluate the presence and trajectory of DIMP in the Arsenal’s soil. USGS 
determined that DIMP had entered into the groundwater from the waste basins between 
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1952 and 1956.221 A later study conducted by the Army concluded that one of the 
earthen waste reservoirs—Basin A—and corroded sewer lines were the most likely 
sources of the contaminants.222 According to the USGS, once DIMP entered the soil it 
spread “in excess of 28 square miles between 1952 and 1975.” The groundwater at the 
Arsenal moved downslope southeast to northwest until it ultimately discharged into the 
South Platte River or First Creek. Using the available data on the groundwater’s flow, 
the USGS determined that the contaminated groundwater could move “as much as 15 
feet per day” to the northwest and “about 1 foot per day” to the north. The water that 
moved north entered First Creek and from there either entered Barr Lake or returned to 
the aquifer between First Creek and Barr Lake, “thus affecting the ground-water quality 
between the arsenal and the city of Brighton.” The USGS did not provide insight as to 
what happened to the DIMP that traveled underfoot northwest into the South Platte 
River. Presumably, dispersal and dilution via the river was the solution to pollution. The 
USGS did recognize, however, that “model simulations of DIMP movement in the 
aquifer indicate that the contaminated ground water readily moves from the area of the 
disposal ponds to the northwest and begins discharging into the South Platte River 
about 4 years after the first introduction of the contaminant to the aquifer.”223 This 
meant that DIMP, at least in the simulation, had reached the South Platte as early as 
1956.  
                                                 
221 U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey, Digital Model Study of Diisopropyl 
Methylphosphonate (DIMP) Groundwater Contamination Rocky Mountain Arsenal Near Denver, 
Colorado, Final Report, by S.G. Robson (June 1977), 1. 
222 Reynolds, Rocky Mountain Arsenal Offpost Contamination Control Plan, 3-1. 
223 U.S. Department of Interior, U.S. Geological Survey, Final Report, 1, 49, 2, 50. 
85 
 
Figure 8: The Suspected Area of DIMP Groundwater Contamination, 1956-1957. 
The estimated boundaries of the plume are noted via a series of hash-marks. Note 
how the plume begins at Basin A, in the lower right corner of the map, and flows 
northwest towards the South Platte. This map is based on both the data gathered 
from testing five area wells, as well as the USGS simulation. Map courtesy of the 
USGS.224 
 
While the USGS investigated the spread of DIMP, the Army also hired a private 
firm, Aerojet Ordnance and Manufacturing Company, to study the impacts of the 
chemical. From June 1975 through July 1977, the Aerojet scientists, led by P.A. 
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O’Donovan and J.E. Woodward, performed several tests to determine DIMP’s toxicity 
to plants, if and where it concentrates in vegetation, and the movement of the chemical 
once it entered the soil. 225 
 In order to uncover how DIMP interacted with plants, O’Donovan and 
Woodward’s group treated a variety of vegetation with DIMP using two methods: 
bathing the plants with water containing DIMP, and culturing the vegetation in DIMP-
contaminated soil. In their hydroponic bath study, the company grew ten species of 
plants while “constantly” bathing their roots with “0, 1, 10, 100, and 1000 ppm levels” 
of DIMP.226 This study revealed that plants flooded with DIMP at a concentration 
between 10 and 100ppm suffered from stunted growth, leaf tip burn, and necrosis. 
Additionally, the plants flooded with 100ppm or higher concentrations of DIMP 
exhibited “severe tissue damage.” In their soil study, the company planted carrot, wheat, 
alfalfa, sugar beet, and bean seeds in soil. They then irrigated these seeds with “0, 1, 8 
and 20 ppm” of the chemical. In another greenhouse, the company repeated the soil 
study but increased the DIMP concentrations to “0, 50, 100, 300, 500, 700, and 
1000ppm.” The results of the soil study closely matched those of the hydroponic bath 
experiment. Plants treated with 50ppm of DIMP showed “marginal symptoms of 
phytotoxicity.” Additionally, the company noted that all of the plants tested in both the 
hydroponic and soil studies, except for the junipers, took up the contaminant and 
concentrated it in their tissues, especially their leaves. Because it was the leaves that 
stored the majority of the DIMP, not the roots that were exposed to the chemical, the 
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company presumed that DIMP followed “the general water movement in the plant” and 
was “somehow trapped in the leaves and accumulates there as the water is lost through 
the various transpiration mechanisms.” The scientists concluded that since DIMP 
“display[ed] little tendency” to accumulate in the portions of plants consumed by 
humans, such as radish, carrot, and bean roots, it “would not function as concentrators 
in the human food chain.” However, the animal food chain was another matter. The 
scientists noted that since farmers sometimes use wheat, fescue, beet and corn leaves as 
animal fodder, DIMP could potentially find its way into the food chain via animal 
feed.227 
Finally, the Aerojet scientists attempted to determine how DIMP moved through 
“various types of soil” after it encountered water. They applied DIMP to five different 
soil plots via two methods. The first method consisted of placing 20ppm of DIMP on 
the surface of the soils and allowing it to absorb and filter down through the plot. The 
second method consisted of mixing the DIMP with the top foot of each soil plot and 
then irrigating it with clean water. 320 days later, the scientists tested each soil sample. 
They found that DIMP diluted and traveled throughout each type of soil in the first 
experiment, with higher concentrations of the chemical located on the soils’ surface. As 
for the second experiment, the scientists found that DIMP traveled more broadly 
throughout each of the soils. Both studies led O’Donovan and Woodward’s group to 
conclude that irrigation water could wash “a single DIMP contamination” throughout “a 
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given soil matrix.” They also found that DIMP “when mixed with wet or dry soils, is 
not lost to the atmosphere by vaporization to an appreciable degree.” Although the 
scientists did not rule out the possibility that DIMP could evaporate in “relatively small 
amounts,” their studies did not point to evaporation as a significant way to disseminate 
the chemical.228 Dilution, extraction, or containment appeared to be the only ways to 
combat the chemical. 
Based on these findings, the Army established several measures to better contain 
and monitor DIMP. Primarily, the Army redirected as much of its liquid waste as it 
could to Basin F. With the cooperation of the Colorado Department of Health and Shell, 
the Army also developed two water monitoring programs to screen both on-post and 
off-post wells.229 To combat DIMP already in the soil, in 1978, the Army constructed a 
pilot groundwater containment and treatment system on the northern boundary of the 
Arsenal that intercepted a 1,500-foot section of the land.230  
With these measures in place, the Army, the EPA, and the State of Colorado 
turned to science to understand DIMP’s toxicity to mammals. Two scientific studies 
yielded conflicting results. In 1979, the scientist R.J. Aulerich and his group studied 
DIMP’s toxicity to American mink (Neovision vison). They found that feeding female 
mink 11, 37, and 95ppm of DIMP for 12 months increased their morality in comparison 
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to the mink that they did not feed DIMP.231 Based on Aulerich’s findings, the State of 
Colorado set a DIMP water standard of 8ppb. A year later, the scientist E.R. Hart 
studied the effect DIMP had on dogs. Hart noted that feeding dogs 75ppm of DIMP per 
day did not produce observable adverse effects. Based on this result, the EPA set a 
DIMP water standard of 600ppb. The EPA chose to base its standard on Hart’s study 
instead of Aulerich’s for two reasons. First, the EPA cited that captive mink had a 
naturally high mortality rate. Second, the EPA noted that canines are physiologically 
closer to humans than mink are.232 The State of Colorado disagreed with this 
assessment. It argued that the EPA relied on flawed data to assess the mortality rates of 
captive mink and that although canines are more similar to humans, the physiology of 
mink was relevant to the human body.233 Regardless of these disputes, the Army 
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seemed to have the DIMP situation under control. As the pilot groundwater treatment 
plant processed water in the north, the Army put its faith in Basin F’s tar lining to keep 
DIMP from further contaminating the soil.  
 Unfortunately, Basin F’s asphalt liner failed to confine liquid waste. After the 
Army pumped DIMP into the basin, the chemical leached into the underlying aquifer 
and traveled approximately twelve miles down slope northwest towards the South 
Platte. Reacting to this, in the late 1980s the Army began pumping the contents of Basin 
F into a series of tanks, incinerated over ten million gallons of the waste, and filled the 
remnants of Basin F with soil.234 
While these efforts removed the source of the contaminant, and even though the 
water treatment system cleaned some of the soil, DIMP continued to plague the land. In 
1990, the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (CDPHE), the 
successor agency of the Colorado Department of Health, sampled private wells in the 
suburbs near the Rocky Mountain Arsenal to track the movement of the plume and its 
concentration. Although the CDPHE could only hypothesize as to the exact shape of the 
plume, its studies demonstrated that DIMP continued to flow northwest underfoot 
despite the Army’s efforts. The next year, the CDPHE petitioned the Colorado Water 
Quality Control Commission (WQCC) to adopt 2ppb as the highest DIMP 
concentration allowable in the region’s groundwater. However, the WQCC continued to 
abide by the 1979 Aulerich study and maintained a groundwater quality standard of 
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8ppb. Yet, the difference between 2ppb and 8ppb was negligible in comparison to the 
high concentrations of DIMP in the area’s wells. According to the CDPHE, some held 
up to 3700ppb of the chemical.235 
As the CDPHE was identifying DIMP in area wells, the U.S. Congress and 
President Bush approved of the Arsenal’s transformation from Superfund site to 
Wildlife Refuge. The Records of Decision (RODs) outlined the means and processes 
the RVO used to remediate the Rocky Mountain Arsenal. These documents worked in 
accordance with the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (CERCLA), also known as the Superfund law, as well as the National 
Environmental Policy Act, and the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution 
Contingency Plan. While one ROD pertained to the remediation of soils, groundwater, 
and infrastructure on-site, the other identified the extent of remediating off-site 
groundwater and soil. The RVO, the EPA, and the State of Colorado approved the Off-
Post ROD in December 1995 and the On-Post ROD in June 1996.236 At first glance, the 
presence of two RODs might have indicated that the RVO weighed the on-post and off-
post remediation equally. However, this was not the case. On-post remediation was 
exhaustive in comparison to off-post effort. The length of the each ROD demonstrates 
this, with the on-site ROD numbered 1,141 pages and the off-site 126.  
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The RODs can be broken down into a handful of generalized processes. The On-
Post ROD directed the RVO to remove contaminated soil down to ten feet and treat 
groundwater around the Arsenal’s borders and in select locations. It also assigned the 
RVO to create two landfills on site for the gathered hazardous waste, and then inter 
them beneath protective covers. This ROD forbad the RVO from excavating the soil ten 
feet below the waste basins, chemical sewers, manufacturing plants, and disposal 
trenches. Those layers of earth were too dangerous to remediate. Finally, the On-Post 
ROD placed restrictions on the use of the Arsenal’s land in perpetuity. The ROD 
prohibited residential developments, agriculture, consumption of fish and game, and the 
drinking the Arsenal’s groundwater until future studies determined their safety.237 The 
Off-Post ROD directed the RVO to remove, treat, and reinject contaminated 
groundwater north of Arsenal in the First Creek and northern paleochannels. In 
accordance with the State of Colorado’s DIMP water quality standard of 8ppb, the 
RODs also directed the U.S. Army and Shell to monitor groundwater directly north of 
the Arsenal and provide an alternative water sources to residents whose wells contained 
8ppb of DIMP or more. This alternative water came in the form of bottled water and 
infrastructure that connected rural areas to municipal water services.238 
While the RODs appeared to offer promising solutions to the DIMP plume, 
some of the community members on the RAB believed that they were not extensive 
enough. They argued that the RVO should have provided bottled water to all 
Coloradans near the Arsenal and that the RVO needed to expand its off-post water 
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treatment facilities.239 The most vocal member of the RAB was John Yelenick. 
Yelenick’s history with DIMP began in 1985, when he arranged to have the well water 
tested on his family farm in Henderson, Colorado. While he was not looking for the 
chemical, the results of the test revealed that his well water contained 425ppb of 
DIMP.240 From that point forward, Yelenick became involved in the struggle against 
DIMP in the greater Denver area. At first, Yelenick’s concerns were personal in nature. 
Wanting to learn about the compound that saturated his well, Yelenick wrote a series of 
letters to the EPA requesting information. As time went on, Yelenick became 
unsatisfied with DIMP’s ambiguous toxicological profile and the extent of remediation. 
By 1996, Yelenick had become an advocate for the health of all Coloradans living near 
the Rocky Mountain Arsenal. 
The history of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal’s remediation is a story about 
community members attempting to work within the RAB’s power structure to bring 
about change. Including concerned residents and representatives from the Sierra Club in 
the RAB, however, allowed the RVO to contain and manage them. Instead of taking to 
the streets or organizing grassroots movements, residents voiced their concerns at the 
monthly RAB forum to the representatives of the supposedly-responsive RVO. In this 
way the RAB coopted local environmentalists. In November 1996, the RAB community 
contingent elected Yelenick as their co-chairperson. In this position he pressed the RVO 
to further investigate DIMP’s presence in off-post groundwater and to do more to 
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remove the chemical from the land northwest of the Arsenal.241 However, his efforts did 
not gain traction with the Army, which permanently filled the second RAB co-chair 
position. Verbal clashes between Yelenick and the Army’s RAB co-chairs ensued. The 
Army heard but did not act upon the input the RAB provided.  
In December 1996, Yelenick obtained a copy DIMP’s new toxicological profile 
published by the Agency for Toxic Substance and Disease Registry.242 The document 
suggested the chemical was “far more deadly than previously suspected.” Disturbingly, 
the profile stated that DIMP had a half-life of 530 years, caused neurological disorders, 
and could cause wildlife mortality with “a single dermal application.”243 In light of this 
report and the RVO’s cursory off-post water monitoring program, the farmer from 
Henderson took it upon himself to test off-post groundwater for DIMP and presented 
his results to the RAB. His studies indicated that DIMP in excess of 8ppb existed 
beyond the Arsenal’s borders and its treatment plants. The Arsenal’s treatment systems, 
according to Yelenick, were constructed too late to capture the DIMP that had already 
flowed off-site. Yelenick especially worried about the DIMP that had already made its 
way into the South Platte River and traveled downstream throughout the region. Despite 
his concerns and his report, the RVO refused to alter the course of the remediation.244   
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Figure 9: Photograph of John J. Yelenick, co-chairperson of the Restoration 
Advisory Board from 1996-1998, real estate broker, and environmentalist. 
Photograph by Sabrina Garvin. Courtesy of John J. Yelenick and Sabrina Garvin. 
 
Failing to sway the RVO, Yelenick reached out to Dr. Thomas Kurt of the 
University of Texas, an expert on toxicology and chemical weaponry. Yelenick hoped 
that Kurt would be able to convince the RVO that the DIMP plume required additional 
measures than the process outlined in the RODs. Yelenick planned to hire Kurt on 
behalf of the RAB pursuant to a Department of Defense rule that allowed restoration 
advisory boards to request federal grants to bring in independent technical consultants. 
In order to file this request, Yelenick had to gain the consent from the rest of the RAB. 
However, the Army was in charge of distributing information to the board. Even though 
Yelenick submitted his grant request to the Army on February 5, 1997, the Army did 
not distribute his materials to the RAB until later in April. When Yelenick looked over 
the packet the Army dispensed to the RAB, he noticed that it was missing key 
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government documents. In Yelenick’s own words: “They did some serious editing.” 
The proposal never got off the ground.245  
While the relationship between Yelenick and the Army grew tense, the EPA did 
not offer any good news to the concerned locals. In February 1997, the EPA advised the 
greater Denver community that the off-post DIMP plume would continue to exceed a 
concentration of 8ppm, the state’s legal limit, until “at least the year 2005.” 
Furthermore, it told Coloradans that outside of the few treatment plants near the 
Arsenal, there would be no additional means to treat the plume.246 Natural dilution over 
time seemed to be the government’s solution to the off-post DIMP problem.  
Because working within the RAB’s power structure failed to alter the course of 
remediation, concerned community members wrote to federal authorities in Washington 
D.C. in the spring and summer of 1997 hoping to find someone who would heed them. 
Letters made their way to the EPA Administrator, the National EPA Ombudsman, and 
the Vice President of the United States, Albert Gore.247 Yelenick’s letter to Gore, dated 
June 11, 1997, is particularly insightful. In it, Yelenick touched on the heart of the 
tension between the RAB’s community contingent and the RVO. He wrote that while 
community members were outraged that the RODs and RVO allowed DIMP less than 
8ppb to concentrate in their drinking water, “they lacked scientific evidence of effect 
and force of law.” The RVO was not responsive to the locals’ concerns because of 
DIMP’s ambiguity and the fact that the RAB lacked legal power. Still, Yelenick hoped 
to persuade the Vice President that “dilution is not an acceptable solution.” Along with 
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pleading with the Vice President on behalf of the health and wellbeing of Denverites, 
Yelenick wrote that DIMP threatened a much wider area than the plume reached. 
“Having migrated beyond all present treatment facilities and dumping into the South 
Platte River,” DIMP endangered “the $1.9 billion dollars of annual farm production 
distributed throughout the country.” By couching DIMP as an “interstate” problem, 
Yelenick hoped to solicit a response from Gore and perhaps procure a more thorough 
remediation of the region.248 
When the Vice President failed to respond to the letter, Yelenick and a few other 
community members formed the RAB DIMP Subcommittee. By gathering in a 
specialized unit, the environmentalists hoped that they could alter the power structure of 
the RAB and more effectively alter the current course of DIMP remediation. On 
December 4, 1997, the Subcommittee tendered its initial report and suggestions to the 
greater RAB. However, as Yelenick later claimed, this report was purposefully “deleted 
from the minutes by the Army.”249 The tension between the Army representatives and 
the locals on the DIMP Subcommittee gave way to volatility in early months of 1998. 
After leaving the February meeting, the community members of the DIMP 
Subcommittee reported that they were “treated in an abusive and disrespectful manner.” 
Responding to this mistreatment, on March 23, 1998, the members of the Subcommittee 
tendered their resignation. “We are not willing to meet under these conditions,” one 
local wrote, “nor with people who come to a discussion without the intent to discuss 
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issues in an open-minded and constructive manner.”250 The DIMP Subcommittee died 
mere months after it began, failing to increase the extent of remediation. 
Later that year, Yelenick’s term as the co-chairperson of the RAB ended. Even 
though he did not convince the RVO to change the trajectory of remediation, he still had 
the thanks and recognition of the community. During the final month of his tenure, the 
Commerce City Beacon published an article titled, “Yelenick’s Legacy—DIMP 
Information.” In it, the paper recognized Yelenick for bringing the public’s attention to 
the DIMP plume and attempting to persuade the RVO to tend to it more aggressively. 
The paper also interviewed Yelenick’s five children about their father. When the 
reporter asked six-year-old Sophia what her dad does, she proudly declared: “he fights 
the government!” Thirteen-year-old Katherine shared that her dad was “making sure 
that no more chemicals get into the groundwater.” Jacob, fifteen, provided a more 
nuanced answer: “all he’s trying to do is to get the government to clean up their best 
before it becomes a bigger problem for everyone in the area.” While the seventeen-year-
old Jonathon did not have much to share with the reporter, his younger brother Josh did. 
Doctors diagnosed Josh with diabetes when he was six years old. With no family 
history of diabetes to blame, Josh, then fourteen, told the paper that his parents 
connected his condition with drinking the contaminated well-water. “I’ve spent more 
than half my life dealing with what the government put out in our water,” Josh shared. 
“They can’t say it is not having any affect, because it is.”251 Because he believed that 
DIMP directly harmed his son, Yelenick did not stop his fight when his term as RAB 
co-chairperson ended. He continued to gather information, make public presentations, 
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and privately test wells north of the Arsenal. However, he had moved on from trying to 
engage with the RVO to bring about change. And so, despite the concerns of 
community members, the trajectory of remediation remained the same. Natural dilution 
over time remained the solution to off-post DIMP pollution. 
Two years later, an unfortunate discovery at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal would 
give Yelenick and concerned citizens another opportunity to try to change the course of 
remediation. On Monday, October 16, 2000, while children were visiting the Rocky 
Mountain Arsenal on a school fieldtrip, remediation crews found a live M139 bomblet 
on site. Workers uncovered the grapefruit-sized munition from a pile of scrap metal in 
“the Boneyard,” a northern region of the Arsenal that previous remediation planners 
believed to be free of “agent or unexploded ordnance.”252 Manufactured in 1969, the 
M139 was an explosive device that contained sarin gas. Sarin is a colorless, odorless, 
tasteless nerve gas that inhibits the junction between the human nervous system and the 
muscles.253 When sarin vaporizes and saturates the air it can kill a person within 
minutes after one deep breath. Although the process is relatively quick, the stages of 
poisoning are horrendous. After first inhaling the gas, the victim’s vision becomes 
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blurry. This is followed by chest pains, poor coordination, and choking. Finally, the 
weapon inhibits the nerves that coordinate the heart and lungs, killing the victim.254 
Although they could not say with certainty how the weapon found its way into the 
Boneyard, Army officials surmised that it rolled off an assembly line unnoticed and into 
the pile of scrap decades ago.255  
Upon discovering the bomblet, remediation workers at the Arsenal immediately 
secured the device by constructing a “Large Area Maintenance Shelter” around the 
scrap pile and slowly informed the public of the bomblet’s discovery.256 Notably, 
Arsenal officials did not direct the school field-trippers to evacuate the grounds.257 
Following protocol, Arsenal officials later that night notified the RAB that they found 
an “anomaly” on site. On Thursday evening, over seventy-two hours after the bomblet 
was found, the Arsenal informed congressional staffers that the “munition potentially 
contained [a] nerve agent.” Finally on Friday, October 20, Arsenal officials held a press 
conference and divulged the discovery to the public.258 
The bomblet’s discovery drew the attention of the EPA. Its National 
Ombudsman, Robert Martin, traveled to Denver on November 7, 2000. Although the 
bomblet did not pose an immediate threat to anyone beyond the Arsenal’s boundaries, 
Coloradans nevertheless flooded the community meeting hosted by Martin.259 Many of 
them connected the Arsenal to their families’ numerous illnesses and tried to convince 
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the ombudsman to help them alter the course of remediation. Annette Biggs of 
Commerce City claimed, for example, that living less than two blocks away from the 
Arsenal ruined the health of her family members. After years of drinking from their 
well and watering their vegetable garden out of it, both of Biggs’s parents developed 
diabetes. She claimed that this water also poisoned her two sisters. As she told the 
ombudsman, each of them required hysterectomies “at an early age” because of cervical 
and endometrial cancer. With no family history of diabetes or cancer to blame, Biggs 
deduced that the Arsenal must have been the source of her family’s medical problems. 
Another Commerce City resident, Mary Light, requested that the Army monitor the 
health of Coloradans living in the suburbs near the Arsenal. She related that in 1994 her 
son died from lymphoma and that her “son had a stillborn son with a wife who grew up 
eight blocks from the Arsenal.” Further adding to her suspicion that the Arsenal caused 
these medical horrors, Light cited that five other people in her neighborhood suffered 
from cancer. Former Henderson resident Royace Broynam shared a similar story. She 
and her family drank the groundwater, and ate vegetables from their garden and fish 
from the pond behind their home. Years later, doctors diagnosed her with brain 
tumor.260 While these residents could not scientifically prove that the Arsenal, or its 
contaminants, caused their families’ illnesses, they refused to believe that their medical 
problems were terrible coincidences. They hoped that by sharing their personal histories 
they could convince Martin to act on their behalf. 
Despite these comments, other Coloradoans still regarded the Arsenal as a safe 
place. Two members of the RAB, Reba Drotar and Kathy Teter, said that they had lived 
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near the Arsenal for many years, in Commerce City, and were quite pleased with the 
remediation efforts. As the Commerce City Beacon recorded, “[Drotar and Teter] told 
the ombudsman and the Army that they and their families are healthy, no health 
problems, what’s the fuss?” Commerce City Councilman Roland Cole also believed that 
the Arsenal was safe. Perhaps wanting to ease the fears of his constituents, Cole shared 
that he had no problem with letting his grandchildren play in the western portion of the 
Arsenal’s grounds.261  
Changes in the Arsenal’s identity perhaps contributed to these more positive 
perceptions. The sign outside of the Arsenal now read “Wildlife Refuge.” Deer, prairie 
dogs, coyotes, and other wildlife lived on the land. Humans have a long history of using 
animals to determine the safety of environments. Earlier in Colorado’s history, when 
coal reigned king, miners on the Front Range looked to mice, not canaries, to determine 
the safety of their mine shafts. If a mouse grew lethargic or lost consciousness, it 
indicated to the miners that high levels of carbon monoxide saturated the air. If a mouse 
suddenly ran out of a shaft at top speed, it meant that the roof overhead was about to 
come down. But, if a mouse scampered through the shaft untroubled, then the miners 
judged the area safe.262 Later in the 1960s, workers at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal used 
canaries and rabbits to determine if the sarin was leaking from its containers.263 In a 
similar manner, some Coloradans perhaps viewed the presence of animals at the Rocky 
Mountain Arsenal as a sign of the area’s safety. 
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But wildlife’s attendance at the Arsenal did not convince Samantha Capps of the 
environment’s safety. As a fifth-generation Coloradan, Capps had a large network of 
family and friends on the Front Range. She feared that Coloradans from around the state 
would go to the Arsenal in search of outdoor recreation and would enter the area 
uninformed of the dangers that potentially dwelled there. Many of her friends and 
family, Capps knew, did not keep up with the Denver newspapers, did not watch 
Denver television, and were not aware of the Arsenal’s toxic legacy. In her comments to 
the ombudsman, Capps shared her concern that the Army, Shell, and the Fish and 
Wildlife Service used the presence of wildlife at the Arsenal to shape public opinion on 
the area’s health. She claimed that these three organizations purposefully portrayed the 
animals as healthy in order to demonstrate to Coloradans that the land was safe. 
However, this depiction, according to Capps, was contrary to the findings of other 
biologists who recorded that the animals at the Arsenal exhibited abnormal behavior. 
Moreover, the animals’ bodies contained pesticide and nerve agent residues. To ensure 
the safety of both human and animal life, Capps suggested to the ombudsman that 
biologists needed to be included in the remediation efforts “because they will require an 
adequate cleanup for the sake of the animals.”264  
John Yelenick seized the opportunity to make his case to the ombudsman that 
the course of DIMP remediation needed to be changed. He gave the ombudsman, and 
the audience, a thorough presentation on DIMP’s toxicity and the plume’s reach. He 
also used the data gathered at the RVO’s water treatment plants to demonstrate that 
while the RVO treated 1.3 billion gallons of groundwater per year, it was failing to treat 
approximately the remaining 429 million gallons of groundwater in the area. Yelenick 
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told the ombudsman that when he shared this information with the RVO in hopes of 
changing the trajectory of remediation, he was “silenced” and “kicked off the RAB.” In 
addition to his longtime DIMP concerns, Yelenick addressed another instance of 
military-induced groundwater contamination in the Denver area. According to recent 
local news broadcasts, reporters found “high levels of cancer-causing agents” flowing 
north from the old Lowry Air Force Base located southeast of the city. This too, 
according to Yelenick, needed to be treated.265  
Finally, the 2000 RAB community co-chairperson, Lee Kaley, told the 
ombudsman that the RVO was not responsive to the RAB’s concerns. Formerly an 
outspoken supporter of the RVO and critic of John Yelenick, Kaley became 
disillusioned with the remediation process after taking a more prominent role in the 
RAB following Yelenick’s resignation. He began his address to the ombudsman by first 
thanking and apologizing to Yelenick and the other community members who he had 
criticized in the past. After becoming co-chairperson, Kaley explained, his relationship 
with the RVO grew tense. He alleged that the Army purposefully edited the transcripts 
of the RAB meetings to diminish the issues that he raised. Kaley’s chief concern was 
that the remediation process at the Rock Mountain Arsenal constituted environmental 
injustice. Kaley resided in Montbello, a predominantly African-American and Hispanic 
neighborhood located directly south of the Arsenal. When he and other citizens of 
Montbello learned that the Army planned to dispose of the bomblet by exploding it on 
site, they went into an uproar. Kaley went so far as to claim that the Army’s purposed 
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plan treated him and the other residents of Montbello “like experimental rats.”266 He 
later told the Denver Post that the EPA was the only agency in which he still had 
confidence. The RAB’s community contingent had grown complacent after years of 
something akin to Pavlovian behavior modification. The Army, Kaley explained, 
“spoon-fed you pablum” and, “if you question some of their policies, they try to shut 
you down.”267 Recognizing that the RAB was a sham, Kaley hoped that the EPA’s 
ombudsman would champion the concerns of the community. 
As ombudsman, however, Robert Martin could only make recommendations to 
the EPA’s administration. He could not directly order the EPA to take any sort of 
action, let alone alter remediation at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal. Martin expressed 
some sympathy with the local residents, but other matters dominated his career in the 
early 2000s. Martin, a member of the Makah Tribe of the Olympic Peninsula, was 
known as “the government watchdog who rides herd” on the EPA.268 On the lookout for 
corruption, in 2002, he questioned whether EPA Administrator Christine Todd 
Whitman’s ties to Citigroup and Travelers Insurance Company influenced her actions 
towards the Shattuck plant, another Superfund site in the Denver area that had 
connections to both corporations.269 He also calculated that Citigroup stood to gain 
financially in cleaning-up the World Trade Center debris if the EPA minimized the 
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dangers the dust posed to New York City residents.270 After Martin accused Whitman of 
directing the EPA with conflicted interests, he resigned from the agency in protest. As a 
result, Martin failed to champion the Coloradans who wanted the RVO to adopt a more-
thorough off-post remediation process.271  
Two days after Martin’s meeting with the frustrated community members, 
remediation workers at the Arsenal unearthed two additional sarin bomblets from the 
Boneyard. A week later, they found another two live bomblets. On November 19, one 
more bomblet was found, along with “three halves of a bomblet,” bringing the total to 
six and one-half active bomblets.272 Like the bomblet uncovered in October, according 
to the Army’s records, these devices should not have been in the pile of scrap metal.273 
To destroy the bomblets, technicians placed them in an airtight machine that ignited 
them and then used a chemical bath to neutralize the poison.274 After the destruction of 
the bomblets, workers resumed their investigation of the Boneyard. On June 15, 2001, 
they found four more live sarin bomblets among the scrap.275 Technicians destroyed the 
last of these bomblets on July 27, 2001, and finished their search of the notorious scrap 
pile.276  
To ensure it was not caught off-guard again by lingering ordnance, the Army 
conducted a series of aerial photographs over the land. Reviewing the collection of 
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photographs yielded over 2,600 “anomalies.” Consulting its records, the Army 
accounted for approximately 2,130 of the “anomalies” and eliminated them as potential 
hazards. With respect to 370 of the remaining “anomalies,” the Army assured residents, 
it had already known about them and had scheduled them for future remediation. The 
final 170 “anomalies” should not have existed. The military had no “historical 
documentation or other existing information” regarding their presence. To investigate, 
the Army sent workers into the field to make visual observations, excavations, and 
exploratory trenches at each of the 170 locations. After concluding of this search and 
reviewing historical documents, the Army expanded its remediation project to include 
six new sites where they identified the existence of either munitions debris, ordinance 
and explosives, or a combination of the two.277  Despite the fact that the discovery of 
these 170 anomalies demonstrated that the RVO’s detailed on-post remediation plan 
was not thorough enough, the RVO did not alter its comparatively-light off-post 
remediation policy. 
As parcels of the land completed the remediation process, the Army transferred 
them to the Department of the Interior. In 2004, the Army transferred 4,930 acres. In 
2006, it transferred an additional 7,226 acres.278 Under the auspices of the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service, sections of the land became available for public use. Visitors could 
spend the afternoon walking on the Arsenal’s trails, enjoy picnic lunches, peruse the 
exhibits at the visitor center, and fish Lake Mary and Lake Ladora. 1,150 anglers held 
permits to fish at the Arsenal in 2004 alone. The Fish and Wildlife Service also 
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collaborated with nearby hospitals to provide activities for the chronically ill. Patients 
from Children’s Hospital Colorado fished at the Refuge once a month from May to 
September 2004. In May and June, patients from Craig Hospital also fished at the 
Arsenal.279 Other public events at the Arsenal included autumn hayrides, guided bike 
rides, photography tours, and educational programs. Birdwatching was also very 
popular.280 With printed checklists and binoculars in hand, visitors attempted to spot 
each of the 273 birds that traveled to the Arsenal throughout the year.281 
 
Figure 10: One of the recreational trails leading to Lake Ladora in 2015.  
Photograph by the author. 
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As remediation neared its supposed completion, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service reintroduced the American Bison to the Rocky Mountain Arsenal in 2007 as 
part of a larger effort to conserve and protect bison within the National Wildlife Refuge 
System. The reintroduction allowed the Service to “monitor and evaluate the effects 
bison have on native short-grass prairie ecology.”282 Bison, the Service explained: 
were historically an integral component of the North American prairie 
ecosystem. Migrating bison provided essential functions, such as grazing and 
other disturbances that, together with fire, drove key ecological processes on the 
prairie. The decimation of the historic bison herds across the continent in the late 
19th century removed this component from the prairie ecosystem. As the Service 
works to restore and conserve prairie habitats throughout the National Wildlife 
Refuge System, the agency has identified wild bison as a species that can and 
will play a vital role in this effort.283 
 
In other words, the sixteen bison that the Service transferred to the Arsenal primarily 
served an ecological purpose. The Service needed bison to keep the prairie from 
becoming woodland.284 
On March 17, 2007, a crowd of some 100 Coloradans lined a fence to watch the 
bison return to the Arsenal’s prairie. “It’s a homecoming!” proclaimed one Fish and 
Wildlife official. As the Denver Post put it, the bison’s relocation to the Arsenal 
“marked both a beginning and an end.” After nearly two decades of remediation, and 
$1.3 billion, the project was nearing its completion. The Arsenal was becoming the 
Refuge. “How often can we say we have gone from weapons to wildlife, bullets to 
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bison?” asked the Deputy Director of the Fish and Wildlife Service. “When you’re 
putting back what is the keystone species, it really takes the Rocky Mountain Arsenal 
full circle.” When the trailer doors opened, the bison cautiously exited and made their 
way west across the prairie. Lee Plenty Wolf, a member of the Oglala Lakota, added to 
the ceremony’s symbolism when he provided a traditional blessing and sang an honor 
song while beating a drum made of bison hide.285  
 
Figure 11: American Bison blocking the roadway at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal 
National Wildlife Refuge in 2015. Since their reintroduction in 2007, the herd has 
grown over time due to natural increase. Photograph by the author. 
 
In 2010 the RVO declared remediation complete. A year later, the RAB 
dissolved.286 And while many Coloradans journeyed onto the Refuge for fun and 
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relaxation, a few still worried about what lurked underfoot. When I met with John 
Yelenick and a few other members of the old RAB in the summer of 2015, they shared 
with me that their view of the Arsenal had not changed over the years. To them, the 
RVO still had not done enough to clean the land, especially in regards to DIMP. In the 
end, the remediation of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal is not a story of community 
members working with the federal government to restore the land. The Army, Shell, and 
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service coopted local environmentalists and ignored their 
concerns. The military-industrial complex continued to dominate the land after the Cold 
War, albeit under a façade of community collaboration. 
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Conclusion 
The U.S. military and its large corporate partners have long histories in the 
American West. On one hand, they brought economic prosperity to the region. On the 
other hand, they dominated and inadvertently degraded the region’s environs. The 
history of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal is a story about people and businesses, all with 
good intentions, building the means to improve their livelihoods, reap economic 
prosperity, and protect themselves and their fellow citizens in an era of heightened 
international tensions. In pursuit of economic and national security, however, they 
transformed a location they valued for its safety—farmland ten miles northeast of 
Denver—into a toxic landscape. In short: this environment became a casualty of war. 
Moreover, the military-industrial complex’s domination of this land did not stop with 
the end of the Cold War. The remediation of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal revealed the 
military’s refusal to cede control of this environment. The complex—as manifested by 
the Remediation Venture Office (RVO)—remained unresponsive to many local 
concerns and undermined residents’ efforts to shape the course of remediation. Instead, 
the RVO coopted the clean-up agenda and contained concerned residents and local 
environmentalists by providing them with a monthly forum and the façade of 
collaboration.  
 We know that the Arsenal’s wares and waste destroyed cities around the globe, 
poisoned wildlife, generated seismic activity, and contaminated groundwater, but much 
of the Arsenal’s history remains shrouded in secrecy. For example, information on how 
the chemicals and weapons at the Arsenal affected the bodies of the people who worked 
there both during the Cold War and the site’s remediation remains scarce. Department 
113 
of Defense secrecy and the protection of medical records under the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPPA) keeps labor’s story hidden 
Even though the Department of Defense and HIPPA keeps information on 
worker health confidential, we do know that Arsenal workers encountered sarin gas 
while on the job. Sarin was one of the many chemical weapons manufactured at the 
Rocky Mountain Arsenal during the Cold War. Similar to some pesticides that Shell 
manufactured at the Arsenal, sarin is an organophosphate. It works by disrupting the 
nervous system, specifically by blocking cholinesterase from interacting with 
acetylcholine. This creates an acetylcholine build-up, which causes convulsions and, in 
certain cases, death.287  
In its 1969 investigation of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal, the Denver Post’s 
weekly magazine—Empire—interviewed Dr. Maurice Gaon, the chief medical officer 
at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal, about worker health. Gaon explained the measures the 
Arsenal had in place to monitor the wellbeing of its workforce. Arsenal physicians gave 
every employee physical exams when they were first employed and when they were 
terminated. Additionally, physicians monitored the health of laborers who worked “in 
dangerous areas,” such as on the sarin production line. This process included sampling 
and analyzing body tissues. As noted earlier, canary and rabbit cages were also located 
in dangerous areas of the Arsenal. The idea behind this measure was that workers could 
watch the health of the animals and, if they observed their mortality, workers would flee 
the area knowing that a dangerous leak was present. Doctors at the Arsenal also paid 
close attention to workers’ faces. Eye pupil dilation and runny noses were two common 
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symptoms of acute sarin poisoning. Gaon also revealed to Empire that Arsenal workers 
did encounter sarin while on the job. “There [were] many hundreds of cases,” Gaon 
related, “where we administered [sarin] antidotes.” However, he also reassured the 
public that exposure to low doses of sarin did not produce “any lasting or residual 
effects.” Along with interviewing Gaon, Empire chronicled one serious case of nerve 
gas poisoning at the Arsenal. In 1963, a worker inhaled “some nerve gas that spilled 
accidentally in a storage area.” Reacting quickly, the Army quickly transported him to 
the nearby Fitzsimons Army Hospital. There he remained in critical condition for 
twenty-four hours as doctors used “all the skills of medical science” to save his life.288  
During his tenure at the Arsenal, Gaon produced an undated “Agent Fact Sheet.” 
These four sheets of paper documented what chemical weapons the Army produced at 
the Arsenal, their characteristics and effects, as well as guidelines for how to treat 
exposure. This document reveals that the Army understood the risks associated with 
manufacturing sarin. “Some personnel,” Gaon recorded, “will be exposed to [sarin] 
through failure to don [their] mask rapidly, through damaged or improperly worn or 
cared for masks and through failure of the warning system to alert all personnel in the 
involved area.”289 Whether via employee error or technological failure, employee 
exposure was unfortunate, but expected to some degree. It was a permitted risk.290 
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One worker who suffered from sarin exposure, Ray Laughbridge, offered his 
story to Denver magazine in 1976. Twenty-one years earlier, the Chemical Corps hired 
Laughbridge, a veteran of World War II and the Korean War, to join the line of 
technicians that manufactured sarin gas at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal. Before taking 
the position, Laughbridge and his co-workers all swore an “oath of silence” that 
prevented them from disclosing what their job entailed or what the Army manufactured 
at the Arsenal.291 Laughbridge abided by his promise to remain silent throughout his 
employment at the Arsenal, even after his five exposures to sarin gas. 
Consistent with the story Gaon provided to Empire, Laughbridge told Denver 
that doctors treated him with shots of atropine—a drug known for alleviating symptoms 
associated with organophosphate exposure—after each of his sarin exposures. 
Following this treatment, the Army sent Laughbridge to see Dr. Joseph Holmes of 
Colorado General, the medical school at the University of Colorado. There, Holmes 
conducted electroencephalogram (EEG) tests on him to monitor how his brain 
responded to the chemical weapon. While this thesis was unable to uncover copies of 
these test results, Laughbridge did provide an excerpt of his medical records to Denver. 
According to this excerpt, in 1957 Holmes recorded that Laughbridge’s test results 
suggested “a mild brain disturbance most marked in the frontal and central regions.” 
However, Holmes never shared this information with Laughbridge. Holmes told 
reporters that it was not his job to inform Laughbridge or other Arsenal workers of the 
results of their examinations. “They just came out here for the tests,” Holmes related in 
an interview, “It wasn’t our duty here to tell them anything.”292  
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After each examination, Holmes and the other doctors working at the medical 
school forwarded Laughbridge’s results to Gaon. However, Gaon was not officially 
Laughbridge’s treating physician. Rather, he was in charge of monitoring employee 
health. While Gaon was concerned about Laughbridge’s short-term health, he was 
confident that mild sarin exposure did not have any long-term effects. Still, 
Laughbridge insisted that his body was changing. While employed at the Arsenal, 
Laughbridge later said, he felt a general “loosening” of his muscles. This loosening 
caused him frequently lose his balance and stumble. Laughbridge also claimed that 
sarin exposure deteriorated his mental faculties. He told Denver that while he worked at 
the Arsenal he slowly became more forgetful over time. When he reported these 
symptoms to Army doctors, they reassured him that sarin was not to blame.293  
 Laughbridge claimed that the secrecy of sarin production necessitated that the 
Army discreetly treated and monitored the health of its employees. To prevent suspicion 
and panic when workers fell ill, the Chemical Corps set up hospital beds at the Arsenal 
for employees to rest on during work days. When employees were too ill to drive to 
work, the Chemical Corps sent ambulances to ferry them to and from the Arsenal. Once 
there, the Army assigned impaired workers light duties and allowed them to read comic 
books and relax when they felt too ill to work. According to Laughbridge, some 
workers were so impaired from sarin exposure that the Army let them read comic books 
for an entire work day. To keep sick workers who insisted on leaving the Arsenal 
complacent, the Army drove them around the area for hours on end until their 
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symptoms let up. These methods allowed the Arsenal to limit their record of lost time 
accidents and keep the production of sarin out of the public’s eye.294  
Despite the Army’s emphasis on secrecy, Holmes published at least one study 
documenting the effects of sarin gas on human health. In 1969, Holmes coauthored an 
article for the Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences with David Metcalf. In it, 
Holmes and Metcalf investigate how exposure to organophosphates, such as sarin, 
altered electrical activity in the human brain. To do this, Metcalf and Holmes examined 
EEG records and conducted sleep studies on workers from the Rocky Mountain 
Arsenal. Their findings suggested that exposure to sarin could lead to chronic EEG 
changes. These EEG changes manifested themselves in a variety of symptoms, such as 
chronic drowsiness, narcolepsy, disturbed memory, and difficulty remaining focused. 
Metcalf and Holmes concluded their article by hypothesizing that long-term exposure to 
sarin could “induce irreversible or only slowly reversible brain dysfunction.”295 
It is reasonable to deduce that a 1979 article coauthored by Maurice Gaon also 
stemmed from information he gathered by studying the health of employees at the 
Rocky Mountain Arsenal. Similar to the Metcalf and Holmes study, Gaon’s article 
examined the long-term effects of sarin exposure to the human electroencephalogram. 
For this study, Gaon and his coauthors examined “seventy-seven industrial workers 
with histories of accidental exposure to sarin.”296 While the authors did not specifically 
state that their subjects were laborers from the Rocky Mountain Arsenal, the fact that 
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Gaon co-authored the piece while he worked at the Arsenal along with the fact that the 
Arsenal was one of three U.S. military installations that produced sarin, suggests that 
the exposed laborers might have worked at the Arsenal.297 Even if the data the authors 
gathered from this study came from another military base, such as Edgewood Arsenal in 
Maryland, the results of the study nevertheless undercut Laughbridge’s assertion that 
sarin caused his muscles to deteriorate over time. 
To uncover the long-term effects of sarin poisoning, Gaon and his coauthors 
compared EEGs taken from people that had a history of exposure to sarin with EEGs of 
thirty-eight other “industrial workers from the same plant.” After careful analysis, the 
authors concluded that exposure to organophosphates, such as sarin, “can produce long-
term changes in brain function.” The study also revealed that it was not possible to 
diagnose workers based on their individual EEGs. The changes in brain activity were 
subtle, consisting of increased beta activity, increased delta and theta slowing, 
decreased alpha activity, and increased amount of rapid eye movement sleep. It was 
only through large statistical comparison that the scientists uncovered that victims of 
sarin exposure had abnormal electrical activity in their brains. Furthermore, these 
changes in brain function did not manifest themselves in terrible symptoms. At most, 
the authors noted that these neurophysiological changes might be related to abnormal 
behavior or moods.298 The EEG tests did not indicate that organophosphate exposure 
caused muscles or minds to deteriorate over time.  
The military and scientific organizations agree that mild sarin exposure does not 
cause long-term muscle or brain declension. According to data compiled by the Office 
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of the Secretary of Defense, sarin exposure might cause long-term behavioral and 
psychological effects, but there is no evidence that suggests mild sarin exposure causes 
long-term muscle or brain deterioration.299 The Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention’s appraisal of sarin’s long-term health effects is telling in its brevity: 
“Mildly exposed people usually recover completely. Severely exposed people are less 
likely to survive.”300 Indeed, sarin causes mortality in large doses but does not 
drastically alter human health in small doses.  
 Despite sarin’s scientific toxicological profile, Laughbridge insisted that 
exposure to the weapon caused his mind and his body to deteriorate over time. Other 
workers supposedly had similar experiences. Denver magazine reported that Joseph 
Romero experienced a general “fuzziness” all over after his first exposure to sarin. Over 
time, this fuzziness gave way to muscle deterioration. Romero lost control of his legs 
and had to rely on a wheelchair. Before his death, Romero insisted that the Arsenal was 
to blame for his failing health. Undercutting the power of this testimony, Denver fails to 
mention where they got Romero’s story from. However, the magazine does mention 
that Romero and Ray Laughbridge were good friends. 301 Therefore, it is reasonable to 
assume that Laughbridge supplied Romero’s story to the magazine.  
After Romero died, his wife Anna joined with Laughbridge and three other 
former Arsenal employees to file a $23 million lawsuit against Gaon and the University 
of Colorado Board of Regents. The widow and the former workers claimed that the 
Arsenal’s chief medical officer and the medical school failed to explain the long-term 
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risks of sarin exposure and therefore were liable. On October 24, 1981, two days before 
the case went to trial, the two sides settled out of court for an undisclosed amount. The 
Denver Post article that documented the settlement did not mention any admission of 
liability.302 Furthermore, it is worth noting that most settlements of this nature do not 
involve any admissions of liability. While the settlement might have eased 
Laughbridge’s financial problems, it did not stop his health from declining. Ray 
Laughbridge died seven years after the settlement303 
Even without access to his medical records, it is highly unlikely that sarin 
caused Ray Laughbridge’s health to deteriorate over time. Sarin’s toxicological profile 
simply does not support such an allegation. But just because science exonerates sarin 
does not mean that the entirety of the Arsenal’s chemical cache is free from scrutiny. 
Perhaps exposure to another chemical or weapon caused Laughbridge’s mind and body 
to deteriorate. To uncover this, future historians would have to circumvent the military’s 
culture of secrecy and health insurance law to obtain Laughbridge’s medical records.  
We do know, however, that the Rocky Mountain Arsenal’s wares and waste 
destroyed foreign cities, poisoned animals, induced earthquakes, and contaminated the 
groundwater. The military-industrial complex in Denver, Colorado, produced both 
economic prosperity and environmental change. Environmental change came in the 
form of both declension and remediation. In both polluting the land and cleaning it up, 
the military-industrial complex demonstrated the extent of its control over the 
environment. 
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The Rocky Mountain Arsenal’s history is important in and of itself, but more 
importantly, it speaks to issues of national significance. The Rocky Mountain Arsenal 
was a significant part of the military-industrial complex’s ecological footprint in the 
American West. Like Hanford, the Rocky Mountain Arsenal was just one cog in the 
military-industrial machine. Historians have yet to produce a comprehensive analysis of 
the military-industrial complex and environmental change in the American West. Such 
a study would perhaps examine Hanford, the Nevada Test Site, Dugway Proving 
Grounds, and the Rocky Mountain Arsenal side-by-side. It might take the lesson offered 
in this thesis and expand it across the West. In producing warfare and national security, 
the military-industrial complex harmed the American landscape.   
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